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Introduction
A daunting welter of variables confronts anyone who sets out to
systematize the First Amendment's effect on the government's role in
regulating social services operated by religious organizations. The task is
further complicated because the regulations in question often were
promulgated as a consequence of the monitoring that inevitably accom-
panies government spending on private-sector welfare programs. The
most suitable methodology should take into account: 1) the nature of the
organizations that are the object of the government's regulation or pro-
gram of aid; 2) the interrelationship between government and religious
organizations that results from the regulation or aid; and 3) the differ-
ence, if any, in the First Amendment's application to regulations benefit-
ing religion through use of its spending power as opposed to those
burdening religious organizations through police power oversight.'
One can examine the first of these variables, the nature of the orga-
nizations that are the objects of government's regulation or the recipients
of its aid, by focusing both on the purpose of the religious organization
through which the aid is channelled and on the type of persons the gov-
ernment's program ultimately seeks to help. Religious charities and so-
cial service ministries characterized by the clientele they serve comprise
quite a long and differentiated list: preschools and child day care centers;
temporary shelters for abused children; foster homes and adoption place-
ment agencies; residential care or group-care homes for abused or ne-
glected children and adjudicated juvenile offenders; adolescent or teen
counseling centers; crisis pregnancy counseling centers; maternity homes
for women with crisis pregnancies; temporary shelters for battered wo-
men; rehabilitation centers for alcoholics, drug abusers, and the unem-
1. These first two factors have similarities with the elements of the Supreme Court's
administrative-entanglement analysis formulated in religiously affiliated school aid cases. For
example, in Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (plurality opinion), Justice
Blackmun said entanglement analysis requires looking at:
(1) the character and purposes of the benefitted institutions, (2) the nature of the aid
provided, and (3) the resulting relationship between the State and the religious
authority.
Id. at 748; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
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ployed; AIDS hospices; prison ministries, police and prison chaplaincies;
halfway houses for adults convicted of crimes; storehouses of free (or
reduced-price) food, used clothing and household items; centers for free
meals (soup kitchens) and temporary shelters for the homeless (rescue
missions); low-income housing renovation programs; long-term care fa-
cilities for the disabled, retarded, and mentally ill; long-term care facili-
ties for the elderly (retirement, nursing, and invalid homes); elderly day-
care centers; centers for vocational training or employment of the dis-
abled; literacy and English-as-a-second-language programs; hospitals and
community health clinics; dispute resolution and legal aid centers; draft
counseling centers; financial counseling centers; marital and family coun-
seling centers; recreational programs, summer camps and retreat centers
for youth and adults; and support groups of every stripe for persons suf-
fering from life's many vicissitudes.
Government aid programs and regulatory schemes are generally ar-
ranged into the foregoing categories and thus by the type of social prob-
lem addressed. The case law sometimes focuses on whether the purpose
of the religious organization is to meet life's physical needs or to address
moral failings.2 Courts are more wary, for example, about government
aid to address teenage pregnancy than about public funding for social
ministries providing emergency housing, free food, or employment of the
disabled. The courts also show increased sensitivity depending on the
impressionability or vulnerability of the persons a government program
seeks to reach. For example, the courts show deference to legislation
assisting adults, but give greater scrutiny where a program benefits a reli-
gious ministry to children or adolescents.3
2. See, e.g., Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589,
623 (1988) (citation omitted):
Government has a strong and legitimate secular interest in encouraging sexual re-
straint among young people. At the same time, as the dissent rightly points out,
"[t]here is a very real and important difference between running a soup kitchen or a
hospital, and counseling pregnant teenagers on how to make the difficult decisions
facing them."... Using religious organizations to advance the secular goals of the
AFLA, without thereby permitting religious indoctrination, is inevitably more diffi-
cult than in other projects, such as ministering to the poor and the sick. I nonethe-
less agree with the Court that the partnership between governmental and religious
institutions contemplated by the AFLA need not result in constitutional violations,
despite an undeniably greater risk than is present in cooperative undertakings that
involve less sensitive objectives.
3. See, e.g., Justice Brennan for the Court in striking down the share-time school pro-
gram in School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985) (footnote omitted):
[An important concern of the effects test is whether the symbolic union of church
and state effected by the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be
perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by
the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices. The inquiry
into this kind of effect must be conducted with particular care when many of the
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The class of persons that the government ultimately seeks to assist is
another factor that complicates constitutional analysis. In the case of
foster care programs and adoption agencies, for example, the religious
organization has a role in parens patriae.4 When government places a
child with a religious organization, the Free Exercise Clause arguably
requires the state to shield the child from religious coercion by the organ-
ization.5 In placing the child, moreover, government may be asked to
honor the religious preference of the biological parents.6 There are still
other occasions when government has near total control over individuals
placed in restricted environments, such as adults in mental institutions,
the armed forces, or those confined in penitentiaries.7 In the latter situa-
tion, for example, the Free Exercise Clause requires government to pro-
vide for the religious needs of those incarcerated by permitting
reasonable access to church-affiliated prison ministries.' On still other
occasions when government compels an adjudicated individual to be in
transitional confinement, such as a community-based, alcohol treatment
program or halfway house for delinquents, the interplay between an indi-
vidual's freedom-from-religion and no-establishment of religion is com-
plicated when the program or house is operated by a religious
organization and has a faith-centered method of behavior modification.
As outlined in the first paragraph, the second fundamental variable
is the interrelationship between government and religion that results
from the program of aid or governmental regulation. This factor can be
subdivided into two considerations. One consideration is the form of the
aid provided by the program. For example, the government benefit may
citizens perceiving the governmental message are children in their formative years.
The symbolism of a union between church and state is most likely to influence chil-
dren of tender years, whose experience is limited and whose beliefs consequently are
the function of environment as much as of free and voluntary choice.
Compare Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (striking down prayer for school-age children)
with Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding prayer at beginning of legislative
session).
4. The inherent authority of a sovereign over minors and incompetent persons. BLAcK's
LAW DIC'rIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
5. See, eg., Arneth v. Gross, 699 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (foster children in Ro-
man Catholic group-care home filed suit for injunction against home's confiscation of their
contraceptive devices and prescriptions).
6. See infra Part III.B.3.
7. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 297 n.72 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (chaplain services in prisons). The Establishment Clause has been
found not to forbid chaplains in the military service, Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir.
1985), nor in prisons, Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d 125 (Iowa 1976).
8. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (rejecting claim of prisoners,
members of Islamic faith, who challenged prison regulations relating to time and places of
work that had effect of preventing attendance at worship service).
take the form of direct cash transfers and grants, reduced postal rates,
low-interest bonds, vouchers, scholarships, tax credits or deductions, free
training of employees, or in-kind transfers of goods such as surplus food,
used furniture or real estate. Certain forms of benefits, such as day-care
vouchers or child-care tax credits, may reduce church-state entangle-
ments and thus lower First Amendment concerns.9
The other consideration is the structure of the religious organiza-
tion's social ministry. Courts and legislatures seem interested in finding
"walls" or boundaries that separate a social ministry from its affiliated
church or other core religious community. Presumably these separating
structures facilitate the receipt of government aid without violating the
Establishment Clause, as well as auger in favor of sustaining the resulting
regulatory oversight.
There is both a dejure or formal, legal structure and a de facto or
true, functional structure between a social ministry and its religious par-
ent. The de jure structure entails the jural relationship between the
church and its social service agency. Examples of relationships are: inte-
grated auxiliary of the church; separate but wholly controlled subsidiary,
nonprofit corporation; corporation sole of an archbishop; separate, non-
profit corporation without interlocking directorates; or para-church,
nonprofit corporation unaffiliated with any denomination.
The defacto structure considers the actual working relationship be-
tween a church and the social ministry. In reality, social ministries fall
not into a neat typology, but along a continuum from the wholly secular
to the very core of what a given religion professes to be all about. None-
theless, the five constructs that immediately follow will be useful. These
heuristic categories appear in the order of least to greatest relatedness to
the core of organized religion, and thus in increasing order of potential
First Amendment concern:
1. Commercial businesses that merely happen to be owned or op-
erated by a religious organization; for several years they have paid
"unrelated business income tax."10
2. Nonprofit organizations that for all practical purposes operate
on a secular, pay-their-own-way basis; today a large portion of the
budget is met by government programs; their tie to a church is
more historical, albeit, many retain a chaplain, religious icons on
the walls, chapels, and clerics on the board of directors; for exam-
9. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
10. I.R.C. §§ 511-512 (1986) (unrelated business income tax); see, eg., De La Salle Inst. v.
United States, 195 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Cal. 1961) (sale of wines by Christian Brothers subject
to tax). See generally LYNN R. BUZZARD & ROBERT A. BUZZARD, UNRELATED BUSINESS
INCOME TAX: LIABILITES OF CHURCHES AND MINISTRIES (1990).
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ple, many hospitals, nursing homes, facilities for mentally retarded,
YM-YWCAs.
3. Nonprofit organizations that in substantial part operate out of
a vibrant religious base and motivation; although a fee for services
may be charged, it often does not pay the cost of service; thus, a
large portion of the budget is met by private donations; their activi-
ties have little commercial potential, but in a normative sense are
charitable or benevolent; there probably exist "nonprofit, secular
counterparts" to such ministries; for example, many temporary
shelters for battered women, alcoholic treatment centers, maternity
homes, soup kitchens.
4. Nonprofit organizations that are "pervasively sectarian" as
that term is defined by the Supreme Court;" these organizations
are in principal part instruments for the propagation of the faith;
they may be an integral part of a church, be separately incorpo-
rated but affiliated with a church, or be a parachurch organization
that nevertheless is fully identified with a particular faith perspec-
tive: for example, many church camps, prison ministries, crises
pregnancy counseling centers.
5. Churches, mosques, synagogues, temples, or other "houses of
worship," using those terms not to identify buildings, but to de-
scribe the organization or society that is the core community
around which a religion identifies and defines itself, conducts its
worship, teaches doctrine, and propagates the faith to children and
adult converts.
As set out in the first paragraph, the third fundamental variable in
this effort to systematize our topic is whether the government's interac-
tion with social service ministries is in the nature of a benefit or a burden.
Police power regulation burdens religion, whereas spending power pro-
grams both benefit religion and entail accompanying oversight that may
burden religious ministry. The First Amendment, and in particular the
Establishment Clause, is concerned with more than improper govern-
ment aid to religion. The Religion Clauses also limit interaction between
church and state in the form of regulation, whether of police power or
spending power origin, that unduly interferes with a ministry's religious
beliefs or practices.12 Logically, there are three basic questions here that
the Religion Clauses address:
1. In what circumstances may government (in purpose or effect)
advance, by funding or otherwise, a belief or practice of a religion?
2. In what circumstances may government (in purpose or effect)
advance, by funding or otherwise, a religious organization?
3. In what circumstances does the First Amendment protect the
institutional integrity of a religious organization from governmen-
tal restrictions?
11. See infra note 77.
12. See infra note 28.
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Questions 1 and 2 are principally Establishment Clause issues, whereas
question 3 implicates both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
The Establishment Clause prohibits governmental largesse from go-
ing to the advancement of certain religious practices (question 1) and
certain religious organizations (question 2), although cases and commen-
tators disagree over where these lines should be drawn. However, when
the benefit to a social ministry is in the form of a legislative exemption
from regulations imposed on secular organizations similarly situated, this
is generally permitted by the Establishment Clause.'"
Finally, do the Religion Clauses insulate certain religious organiza-
tions from regulations invasive of their faith practices (question 3), when
secular organizations similarly situated have no such First Amendment
immunity from regulation? To further complicate the matter, the
strength of a Religion Clauses defense apparently depends on whether
the source of the government's authority is police power or spending
power. Following the recent decision in Rust v. Sullivan,14 in a govern-
ment-funded program, the government may restrict participants' free
speech in furtherance of reasonable governmental policies unrelated to
the suppression of the speech. The same is presumably true of religious
freedom, for in principle these First Amendment guarantees are not dis-
tinguishable in this context.
The foregoing issues posed in questions 1, 2, and 3 are addressed in
Parts I and II. Part III surveys the Supreme Court and lower-court case
law, as well as federal and state legislation, that directly bear on the First
Amendment rights of social service ministries.
13. See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
14. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (sustaining restrictions on federally funded family planning
clinics by prohibiting abortion-related counseling, referrals, or advocacy by health care profes-
sionals, and by requiring funded clinics to maintain facilities, personnel, and records separate
from clinics that provided abortion-related services). The Court rejected the argument that
co ngressional spending power was being used to create an unconstitutional condition. The
regulations placed a condition on the federally funded program, explained the Court, not a
condition on the health care professional:
The Title X grantee can continue to perform abortions, provide abortion-related serv-
ices, and engage in abortion advocacy; it simply is required to conduct those activi-
ties through programs that are separate and independent ....
... [Olur "unconstitutional conditions" cases involve situations in which the
government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a
particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engag-
ing in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program.
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I. Is Strict Separationism No Longer Plausible?
For centuries, churches and other religious institutions have en-
gaged in charity as part of their understanding of themselves and their
calling to meet the physical and spiritual needs of humanity. 5 In the
eighteenth century, the period of our nation's founding, and through
much of the nineteenth century, social welfare was marked by an amica-
ble cooperation between public and private philanthropy.16
Following the Civil War, and increasingly during the first quarter of
this century, government undertook a more affirmative role in allocating
the goods and opportunities available in society and thereby profoundly
affecting the structure of the social order. At first, charitable ministries
of religious organizations continued to work along side, but largely
uninvolved with, these governmental "secular counterparts." The Great
Depression and the government's response to it through the New Deal,
determined that government, rather than private, agencies would have
primary responsibility for charity.' 7 Voluntary societies were simply
overwhelmed with the need. This reallocation of responsibility occurred
as the notion of state police power expanded from initially addressing
only the health and safety concerns of the population, into a power to
legislate on behalf of the "general welfare" broadly defined.' 8 The
growth in publicly provided services also paralleled the government's
ability to raise the large sums of money required to pay for these pro-
15. WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SO-
CIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 2-6, 32-34 (4th ed. 1989); A.P. STOKES, 2 CHURCH AND STATE
IN THE UNITED STATES 255 (1950). On the history of church involvement in the social wel-
fare field and the manner whereby differences in theology affect the character of ministry to the
needy, see BERNARD J. COUGHLIN, CHURCH AND STATE IN SOCIAL WELFARE 15-43 (1965)
(Protestant, Catholic and Jew); JAMES LEIBY, A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND SOCIAL
WORK IN THE UNrrED STATES 12-22 (1978) (importance of Protestant ethic in American
thought on interrelationship of work, economy and charity); Robert H. Bremner, Private Phi-
lanthropy and Public Needs: Historical Perspective, in 1 RESEARCH PAPERS 89, 90-92 (Comm'n
on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs 1977)(Puritans and Quakers). For a description of
developments concerning religious charities and government in the State of New York, see
JOHN W. PRATT, RELIGION, POLITICS, AND DIVERSITY: THE CHURCH-STATE THEME IN
NEw YORK HISTORY 204-24 (1967).
16. TRATTNER, supra note 15, at 34-36; Bremner, supra note 15, at 103-04.
17. TRATTNER, supra note 15, at 256-58; LEIBY, supra note 15, at 274-75.
18. See generally WILLIAM NELSON, THE RooTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830-
1900 (1982); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION
OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982); LOREN BETH, THE DEvEL-
OPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTrrUTION, 1877-1917 (1971); Calvin Woodward, Reality
and Social Reform: The Transition from Laissez-Faire to the Welfare State, 72 YALE L.J. 286
(1962).
grams through taxation of an expanding economy. 9 Finally, the needs
of the waves of immigrants, and the nation's industrialization and urban-
ization, placed greater demands on government to provide social serv-
ices.2" Progressively, many spheres of society once deemed private, or at
least non-statist, gave way to this governmentalization.21
Yet a third phase has been unfolding in modern times, namely a
return to the provision of social services through a partnership of govern-
ment and the private sector. Two considerations are fueling this partial
reversion: budgetary constraints on government and widespread discon-
tent with the inefficiency and poor quality of the government programs.22
The President's "thousand points of light" theme is a sound-bite descrip-
tion of the government's ever growing turn to the entrepreneurial, volun-
teer sector to meet society's social welfare needs.
An interpretation of the Establishment Clause using a strict separa-
tionism framework, means that government must doggedly avoid utiliz-
ing its power to grant any benefits to, or incur measurable interaction
with, religious organizations.23 While acknowledging that government
must be "neutral" as to religion, separationists reject the argument that it
is nonneutral for government to exclude religious organizations from
equal participation with other private-sector organizations in social wel-
fare, entitlement, and grant programs. The religious liberty they advo-
cate is over against a government deeply involved with churches and
their educational and social welfare auxiliaries. Government cannot help
but affect everything it touches, including religion. Strict separationists
would avoid this at all cost because each individual should exercise com-
plete freedom of conscience in matters of religious faith, a faith neither
encouraged nor tainted by involvement with government. Anything less
19. See TRAiTNER, supra note 15, at 201-15; George H. Guilfoyle, Church-State Rela-
tions in Welfare, 3 CATH. LAW. 112, 118 (1957).
20. See HAROLD L. WILENSKY & CHARLES N. LEBEAUX, Industrial Society and Social
Welfare 49-89 (1958); STOKES, supra note 15, at Vol. I, 693.
21. This development is most easily traced in the common school or public school move-
ment, which has substantially supplanted church-operated primary and secondary education.
Today independent religious schools comprise a mere 9.1% of the children being educated at
the primary and secondary levels. Kline Capps & Carl H. Esbeck, The Use of Government
Funding and Taxing Power to Regulate Religious Schools, 14 J. L. & EDUc. 553, 554 n.5
(1985). But the same phenomena, on a somewhat lesser scale, has taken place in the arena of
charity and social welfare.
22. TRATTNER, supra note 15, at 328-34; COUGHLIN, supra note 15, at 133-49. See
LESTER M. SALAMON & ALLEN J. ABRAMSON, THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN THE REAGAN
EXPERIMENT 222 (J. Palmer & I. Sawhill eds., 1982).
23. See generally Carl H. Esbeck, A Typology of Church-State Relations in Current Amer-
ican Thought, 8 FAITH AND MISSION 3, 7-12 (1990) (defining and comparing "strict" and
"freewill" separationists).
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will both corrupt religion and make government into an instrument of
religious imposition. Accordingly, strict separationists insist church and
state, each within its own sphere and for their mutual protection, are to
remain as completely uninvolved with one another as possible.
When government was small and much of society was in the private
sector, this strict notion of separationism was quite plausible. The social
service ministries of religious organizations could be deeply involved in
societal life, and at the same time largely avoid interaction with govern-
ment. With the arrival of "big government" and the "welfare state,"
however, enforcing an absolutist separationism would require confining
social ministries to smaller and smaller enclaves of private life. Thus, the
insistence that a hermetic separation of church and state is "neutral" is
less plausible. If social service ministries are to participate as partners
with government, strict separationist theory demands that religious so-
cial services must first secularize. These secularizing demands run the
gamut of the superficial (insistence that religious symbols be stripped
from a charity's walls) to the very substantive (jettisoning all sectarian
content in an agency's program or curriculum).
The American religious community has responded in various ways.
Some were eager to secularize, thus trading their faith distinctives for
government dollars. This was little loss for some, because the ecclesial
leadership no longer held to the proselytizing purposes on which the
ministry was founded. Others sought to qualify for the state aid, but
asked for accommodation and tolerance of the agency's sectarian distinc-
tives where the religious practices could be segregated from the delivery
of "secular" services. Still others resisted and refused to participate at all
in the government programs. Such resistance was either to maintain the
integrity of the religious program or because the leaders themselves
agreed with the strict separationist view as the only sure means of keep-
ing religion from being compromised by too close an involvement with
government. Unless the devotees of a religion, these leaders argued, are
willing to finance the entire budget of its charities by sacrificial giving, it
is better that the ministry close its doors than go on the dole.
On the ascendancy is the argument that to secularize religious social
ministries in order that they might participate in government programs
on an equal basis with their secular counterparts, is a "penalty" the Es-
tablishment Clause does not demand. Indeed, some have argued, as yet
unsuccessfully,24 that denial of equal participation is invidious discrimi-
nation and thus a violation of the very religious liberty guaranteed by the
24. See, e.g., Richard Neuhaus, Establishment is not the Issue, 4 THE RELIGION & SoCI-
ETY REPORT 1-3 (June 1987); Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abor-
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First Amendment. In any event, the more extreme forms of separation-
ism are built upon two myths: that modem government has limited con-
trol over the resources of society diverted to charity, and that church-
related social services take place within discrete and clearly defined
boundaries easily segregated from the charitable organization's sectarian
beliefs and practices.25
Different means of delivering benefits to religious social agencies are
therefore touted. Some of these means are day-care certificates for low-
income parents, school vouchers, and tax credits. These devices stand
out because the government provides aid directly to parents, students, or
those ultimately to benefit from the social service. Thus the element of
recipient choice can work to insulate the religious charity from direct
involvement with government officials. Further, the many recipients -
not government - choose which religious or secular agency benefits
from the statutory aid.26 The success of the recipient-choice means of
delivering aid both in safeguarding the institutional integrity of the reli-
gious ministry and in achieving equal private-sector participation in wel-
fare programs remains to be seen.
tions and Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REv. 989 (1991) (arguing, inter alia, that denial of
funding for religious schools acts to deny religious choice).
25. Justice Brennan, concurring in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970), ob-
served that religious enterprises are not easily separated into the sacred and the profane:
Appellant assumes, apparently, that church-owned property is used for exclusively
religious purposes if it does not house a hospital, orphanage, weekday school or the
like. Any assumption that a church building itself is used for exclusively religious
activities, however, rests on a simplistic view of ordinary church operations. As the
appellee's brief cogently observes, "the public welfare activities and the sectarian ac-
tivities of religious institutions are... intertwined .... Often a particular church
will use the same personnel, facilities and source of funds to carry out both its secular
and religious activities." Thus, the same people who gather in church facilities for
religious worship and study may return to these facilities to participate in Boy Scout
activities, to promote antipoverty causes, to discuss public issues, or to listen to
chamber music. Accordingly, the funds used to maintain the facilities as a place for
religious worship and study also maintain them as a place for secular activities bene-
ficial to the community as a whole. Even during formal worship services, churches
frequently collect the funds used to finance their secular operations and make deci-
sions regarding their nature.
... Appellee contends that "[a]s a practical matter, the public welfare activities
and the sectarian activities of religious institutions are so intertwined that they can-
not be separated for the purpose of determining eligibility for tax exemptions." If not
impossible, the separation would certainly involve extensive state investigation into
church operations and finances.
Id at 688-89, 691.
26. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1983) (upholding a state income tax
deduction for parents paying parochial school tuition); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs.
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding a state vocational rehabilitation grant to disabled
student choosing training as cleric).
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American religious communities are sensitive to the threat to their
sectarian distinctives when becoming unduly allied with or "used" by
government to achieve state policy goals. It is understood (but perhaps
unevenly appreciated) that when a temporal service is rendered by reli-
gion, this worldly contribution is only possible if religion itself retains its
integrity and purity of selfless motivation. Religion must maintain some
distance from politics and the affairs of state. It is fundamental - and
admittedly paradoxical - that the worldly uses of religion often dimin-
ish in precisely the same degree that religious social agencies themselves
become worldly:
[T]he worldly contribution of religion is possible only if religion
itself remains otherworldly. In recent years we have been told over
and over again how religion must become more worldly, more of
service to society, more "relevant" in terms of this or that social or
political agenda.... [A]ny institution remains "relevant" as long
as it has something distinctive to offer. Religious institutions are
no exception. The religious institution that becomes indistinguish-
able from other institutions, such as political lobbies or therapeutic
agencies or radical caucuses (or, needless to add, conservative
caucuses), in very short order has great difficulty answering the
question of why it should exist as a separate institution at all. At
this point it has become "irrelevant" in the strictest sense of the
word - the sense of redundancy and obsolescence.27
To be sure, the entire nation gains when religious ministries serve the
temporal needs of society. Ultimately, however, religious communities
do not exist to sustain the social and political order, albeit such is often a
derivative of religious good works. If government were to use religion as
merely another tool to achieve policies of state, the church is in danger of
becoming a harlot to the aims of government. The doctrine of church
autonomy - a line of First Amendment cases recognizing the unique
institutional character of organized religious communities - has grown
in part, out of this realization.28
27. Peter L. Berger, The Serendipity of Liberties, in THE STRUCTURE OF FREEDOM: COR-
RELATIONS, CAUSES, AND CAUTIONS 1, 16 (R.J. Neuhaus ed., 1991).
28. Unlike the instrumental and entirely individualistic concept of freedom for noncom-
mercial voluntary associations, the Establishment Clause inescapably acknowledges the dis-
tinct existence or ontology of religious organizations through the requirement of church-state
separation. The legal duty of maintaining the institutional separation of church and state is
addressed to government and the involvement it contemplates with identifiable sectarian socie-
ties and their particular modes of religious practice. No other private associations must be
separated from government. Unlike all other voluntary associations, the separation mandate is
testimony that the place of religious organizations has been recognized as a special problem for
which the Establishment Clause is directed to making special provision. ("Special" here im-
plies neither favoritism nor hostility toward religious organizations, but simply indicates
unique treatment.) The Juridical Status of Churches, in INSTITUTE OF CHURCH AND STATE:
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II. Government Conferring Benefits and Imposing Burdens on
Religious Ministries and the Establishment Clause
Before turning to specific types of laws affecting social ministries, it
is helpful to briefly survey Supreme Court First Amendment cases con-
cerning welfare programs benefiting and burdening religious organiza-
tions. The cases fall into four lines of authority: (A) when legislation
confers a benefit on religious organizations, and the same benefit is af-
forded to secular organizations similarly situated; (B) when legislation
withholds a benefit from religious organizations, whereas the same bene-
fit is available to secular organizations similarly situated; (C) when legis-
lation refrains from imposing a regulatory burden on religious
organizations, whereas the burden is imposed on secular organizations
similarly situated; and (D) when legislation imposes a burden on reli-
gious organizations, and the same burden is imposed on secular organiza-
tions similarly situated.
A. Government Conferring a Benefit on Religious Organizations, When
the Benefit is Generally Afforded to Others Similarly
Situated
The question often arises whether the Establishment Clause permits
government to confer a benefit on religion, when the same benefit is con-
PROCEEDINGS 1, 29, 36, 47-49 (O'Toole ed., 1958) (comments by Brady and Pfeffer); cf.,
Herbert Richardson, Civil Religion in Theological Perspective, in AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION
161, 178-80 (Richey & Jones eds., 1974). The institutional separation of church and state
implemented by the Establishment Clause is for the mutual benefit of both. Accordingly, the
church refrains from co-opting the state's influence or the civil law's coercive power to achieve
its sectarian purposes. Reciprocally, the church qua church is safeguarded, absent compelling
reasons, from state interference within its spiritual and ministerial province. The Supreme
Court's cases have recognized in the First Amendment this fuller, quasi-sovereign conception
of liberty held by religious organizations. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 14-11, at 1236 (2d ed. 1988); MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND
ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 177 (1986) (church au-
tonomy identified as an example of "neo-feudalist influence on constitutional thinking"); Mark
DeWolfe Howe, Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91, 92-95
(1953) (church autonomy identified as the "political philosophy of pluralism" that gives reli-
gious bodies "some of the prerogatives of sovereignty"); Frederick M. Gedicks, Toward a Con-
stitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 99; Douglas Laycock,
Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and
the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373 (1981); Developments in the Law:
Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1740-81 (1987). This is most easily seen in
cases sustaining the assertion by churches of a right of autonomy from civil jurisdiction. See
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (no civil court authority to
hear claim by dissident cleric that church violated its internal rules of procedure); Kedroff v.
St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (overturning state legislation that displaced church
administrator appointed by Russian Orthodox Church and passed control to the Russian
Church in America).
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ferred on all others similarly situated.29 Such benefits may take the form
of direct cash grants, reduced postal rates, vouchers, tax credits, and in-
kind transfers such as textbooks, surplus food or the use of public facili-
ties. The Supreme Court's analysis has remained the much criticized
three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman:
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster "an exces-
sive government entanglement with religion.
' 30
The Court and Congress have found that a benefit generally avail-
able to secular recipients may also be conferred on religious students and
parochial school parents;31  patients choosing religious hospitals;
32
29. Many Supreme Court cases concern governmental aid that benefits only religion, thus
these cases are not pertinent to this discussion. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573 (1989) (public display of menorah and nativity of Christ); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S.
39 (1980) (per curiam) (posting of Ten Comniandments in public school classroom); School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (devotional Bible reading at public school); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (public school prayer); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203
(1948) (on-campus release time for religion classes).
30. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citations omitted). This three-part test has come in for
considerable criticism, including critical comment by several Justices of the Supreme Court.
See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655, 659 (1989) (Justice Kennedy,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia, suggests a test that "govern-
ment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it may
not... give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact 'establishes a [state]
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so' "); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting, suggests the abandonment of the purpose prong of the Lemon test);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, suggests a test whereby
government may support religion so long as there is no preferential treatment between reli-
gions); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring, suggests a
test of no-endorsement of religion); Committee for Public Educ. & Relig. Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 821-23 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (objecting to the entanglement prong of the
Lemon test- as creating an insoluble dilemma for state aid to church-related programs and
complaining of the majority's application of the second prong as any rather than the primary
effect).
Criticism of Lemon and recent changes in the personnel of the Supreme Court have
caused commentators to speculate that the Lemon test will be overruled during the 1991 Term
when the Court takes up the case of Lee v. Weisman, 908 F.2d 1090 (Ist Cir. 1990), cert
granted, 111 S.Ct. 1305 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1991) (No. 90-1014).
31. Concerning students, see Board of Educ. v. Mergeas, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990) (equal
access to speech forum at high school); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servis. for the Blind,
474 U.S. 481 (1986) (vocational rehabilitation program to study at college of choice); Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (equal access to speech forum at university); Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (loan of secular textbooks for use at schools); Cochran v. Board of
Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) (free secular textbooks). Concerning parents, see Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388 (1983) (state income tuition tax deduction for parents of school-aged children);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (reimbursement to parents for cost of school
transportation). There are, of course, numerous Supreme Court cases where aid to primary
and secondary parochial schools-as distinct from aid to students or parents-has been de-
nied. These cases are collected infra note 75.
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church-related colleges 33 and teenage counselling centers; 34 parents
choosing church-based day care centers;35 taxpayers contributing to reli-
gious groups; 36 and nonprofit tax exempt religious organizations.
37
It is unclear whether the government may aid religious organiza-
tions but not nonreligious organizations with like tasks. In Zorach v.
Clauson,38 the Supreme Court sustained a public school, off-campus re-
lease-time program for students to attend religious classes, but not classes
of other subject matter. However, several recent cases suggest that the
benefit must target a more inclusive group of recipients as defined by a
secular purpose or criteria.39
In conferring a benefit, the government may not discriminate by de-
sign or purpose on the basis of religious affiliation or denominational
membership.' However, the court has upheld programs that have a dis-
32. Both Medicare and Medicaid have explicit freedom-of-choice provisions permitting a
recipient to choose a church-based hospital. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395a (1988); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(23) (1988).
33. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (plurality opinion); Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). Both Roemer and
Hunt are discussed infra note 77.
34. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). Bowen is discussed infra text accompanying
notes 86-111.
35. A tax credit is available for child-care expenses of two-paycheck families, including
families who select a church-based preschool. I.R.C. § 21 (1988). Under Title XX of the
Social Security Act, day-care centers, including those with religious affiliation may be reim-
bursed for the cost of providing services to qualified low-income families. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1397a (1988).
36. Federal income tax deductions are provided to those making charitable contributions,
including donations to religious organizations. I.R.C. § 170 (1988).
37. Tax-exempt status is available, inter alia, to religious organizations. I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (1988).
38. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
39. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 10-18 nn.2-8 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(striking down sales tax exemption for sales of religious literature by religious organizations;
tax exemptions for religious groups and activities must embrace the nonreligious as well as the
religious as defined by some overarching secular purpose such as cultural and moral improve-
ment of society); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (dicta suggesting that moment of si-
lence to begin school day is constitutional if statute does not mention prayer and purpose is not
wholly religious); id. at 62 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 67 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at
84 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id at 90 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (tax deduction available to all parents of school-age
children; distinguishing Committee for Pub. Educ. & Relig. Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (striking down tax credit available only to parochial school parents)); see also Board of
Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990) (equal access to public forum case that found no
violation, inter alia, because forum open to all student groups); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263 (1981) (same).
40. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (charitable solicitation law struck down, inter
alia, because of evidence that legislature motivated by animus toward new religious move-
ments); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 451-52 (1971) (selective service system that
granted conscientious objector status to pacifists, but not to those holding "just war" belief,
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parate impact or discriminatory effect on the basis of religious belief.41
B. Government Withholding a Benefit from Religious Organizations,
When the Benefit is Available to Others Similarly Situated
In designing programs of aid, the Court has held that the First
Amendment generally does not require government to confer benefits on
religious organizations merely because the aid goes to secular groups
similarly situated.42 The only exceptions are where the Supreme Court
has held that the Free Exercise Clause requires that the benefit be ex-
tended to religious individuals,43 or the Free Speech Clause requires that
was constitutional, inter alia, because exemption rooted in religious belief and not membership
in particular denomination or church); Wilson v. NLRB, 920 F.2d 1282 (6th Cir. 1990),peti-
tion for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3014 (1991) (No. 90-1362) (holding section 19 of National
Labor Relations Act unconstitutional due to its requirement of membership in "bona fide reli-
gion" to take advantage of union membership exemption).
41. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989) (denial of tax deduction for
money paid to receive a service provided by new religious movement that adversely affects its
adherents not thereby unconstitutional; IRS requirement that deductible contributions be
without consideration was constitutionally neutral); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574, 604 n.30 (1983) (tax exemption legislation that in its interpretation has effect of
disfavoring religious belief that races should not mix or inter-marry not unconstitutional); Hef-
fron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (state fair regula-
tion concerning crowd control that had adverse effect on religious practice of soliciting sales
and contributions from public not unconstitutional); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437,
454-60(1971) (selective service legislation that in its effect favored religious pacifists over "just
war" adherents not unconstitutional).
42. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 nn.29-30 (1983) (religious, ra-
cially discriminatory school).
43. Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment See., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (state unemploy-
ment compensation may not be denied to person unwilling to accept employment that conflicts
with religious belief or practice); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136
(1987) (same); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)
(same); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (same).
There are four steps in every claim brought under the Free Exercise Clause. First, the
claimant must show that his religious belief is sincerely held. Second, the claimant must show
that the government's action burdens his religious belief, i.e., coercion of conscience is present
to a degree that cannot be fairly said to be insignificant. Once the sincerity and coercion
elements are demonstrated, the burden of producing evidence shifts to the government. At
this point, the free exercise claimant prevails unless the state can prove two elements: first,
that the societal interests at stake are compelling; and, second, that the state cannot achieve its
purpose by means less restrictive to conscience. See Frazee, 489 U.S. 829; Thomas, 450 U.S.
707; and Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398.
The recent case of Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), ostensibly overturns
this time-honored four-step test, but it remains to be seen if Smith's material departure from
precedent will become the standing order. Certainly alarms are sounding that Smith has
worked a sea of change in Free Exercise Clause doctrine. See, e.g., Michael McConnell, Free
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHi. L. REv. 1109 (1990); Douglas Lay-
cock, The Remnant of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Cr. REv. 1. Indeed, Congress has under
consideration legislation to circumvent the harsh results of the Smith decision. See Religious
a public forum be available to everyone - including religious groups -
without regard to the content of the speech.'
C. Government Refraining from Imposing a Burden on Religious
Organizations, When the Burden is Applicable to Others
Similarly Situated
The Court has held that a legislature may refrain from imposing
regulatory burdens on religious societies for reasons of tolerance or to
reduce church-state entanglement,45 and that such exemptions need not
be extended to a more inclusive group as defined by a secular purpose or
criteria.46 A legislature may not grant an exemption with the purpose to
discriminate along denominational lines or by religious affiliation. 7
However, a religious practice or belief may be exempted if the exemption
has a secular purpose. Such an exemption may have an incidental effect
of discriminating on the basis of religious belief,48 and such an exemption
need not be broadened when to do so invites increased church-state
Freedom Restoration Act of 1991, H.R. 22797, 102d Con., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. RFc. H5210
(1991).
44. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990) (public school may not, consistent
with Free Speech Clause, deny equal access to limited public forum because content of speech
is religious); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (same).
45. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding consti-
tutionality of§ 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-i (1988), which exempts
from its nondiscrimination requirements discrimination on the basis of religion by religious
employers); see Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982) (dictum approving
zoning ordinances that protect houses of worship); St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981) (unemployment tax); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S.
490 (1979) (National Labor Relations Act); 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1987), overturning Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (denying free exercise right to military chaplain to wear
religious headgear indoors contrary to regulations); "Church Amendment" to the Hill-Burton
Act providing that denominational hospitals receiving federal aid under the act need not per-
form abortion or sterilization procedures if contrary to their beliefs, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (1988)
(the constitutionality of the Church Amendment was upheld in Chrisman v. Sisters of St.
Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974)).
46. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989) (plurality opinion) (discuss-
ing why the religion-only benefit upheld in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), and the
religion-only exemption in Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), are consistent with the Establishment
Clause); Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327; Forest Hills Early Learning
Ctr., Inc. v. Grace Baptist Church, 846 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029
(1989) (constitutional to exempt church-operated child care centers from state regulations); see
Commonwealth v. Arlan's Dep't. Store, 357 S.W.2d 708 (Ky 1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S.
218 (1962) (constitutional to exempt Jewish businesses from Sunday closing law).
47. See cases cited supra note 40.
48. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); see Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490
U.S. 680 (1989); Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.30 (1983); Heffran
v. International Sec'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
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entanglement.49
Concerning tax burdens, a legislature may refrain from imposing
such a burden on religion,5" so long as the tax exemption also benefits
similarly situated nonreligious groups as justified by some overarching
secular criteria."1
D. Government Imposing a Burden on Religious Organizations, When
the Burden is Imposed on Others Similarly Situated
The Court has held that a legislature need not refrain from imposing
a general regulatory burden on religious organizations,5 2 except in cases
of extreme inhibition of religion or instances of highly invasive adminis-
trative entanglement.5 3 In First Amendment analysis, regulatory bur-
dens are more likely to be problematic when dealing with pervasively
sectarian organizations 4 and the noncommercial aspects of religious
organizations.5
A legislature need not refrain from imposing a general tax that falls
on religion, except in cases of extreme inhibition of religion or instances
of highly invasive administrative entanglement.5 6 However, no fiat li-
cense tax may operate as a prior restraint on religion, nor may religious
49. Gillette, 401 U.S. 437, 450; see Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization,
493 U.S. 378, 396-97 (1990); Hernandez, 490 U.S. 680; Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604 n.30;
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272 n.11 (1981).
50. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (exemption from property tax); see St.
Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981) (exemption from
unemployment compensation tax).
51. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 10-18 nn.2-8 (1989).
52. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (federal
maximum hour and minimum wage laws).
53. The two exceptions are violative of the second and third prongs of Lemon. See supra
note 30 and accompanying text.
54. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (National Labor Relations Act not
applicable to lay teachers employed by Catholic primary and secondary schools). The term
"pervasively sectarian" is defined infra note 77.
55. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 292 (maximum hour and minimum wage
legislation applicable to the following operations of religious ministry: "service stations, retail
clothing and grocery outlets, hog farms, roofing and electrical construction companies, a rec-
ord keeping company, a motel, and companies engaged in the productions and distribution of
candy") But cf Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
56. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 392, 395-96; Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,
489 U.S. 1 (1989); Bethel Baptist Church v. United States, 822 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988) (discussed infra note 63); cf Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490
U.S. 680 (1989); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (requiring Amish employer to
withhold social security tax from wages of his employers, inter alia, because of government's
compelling interest in uniform tax collection compliance).
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activity be singled out for burdensome tax treatment.5 7
MI. A Review of the Statutory and Common-Law Interaction
with Social Service Ministries
As explored in Part II, the interplay between law and religious agen-
cies devoted to working on social problems takes the form of both regula-
tory burdens and the provision of a variety of governmental benefits. 8
This interaction with the positive law is at three levels: (A) federal statu-
tory law and regulations promulgated thereunder; (B) state and local leg-
islation and its accompanying regulations; and (C) the common law in its
various manifestations of contract, tort, property, and trust law. This
part addresses in turn each of these three levels.
A. Federal Statutes and Regulations
The federal law can be usefully divided into four categories: (1) la-
bor law and employee benefits legislation; (2) taxes, tax regulation, and
tax benefits; (3) civil rights acts prohibiting discrimination in employ-
ment and public accommodations; and (4) spending power legislation.
Principal examples of the interaction between social ministries and
federal labor law and employee benefits legislation are: (i) the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act;-9 (ii) the Fair Labor Standards Act and Child
57. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 385-92 (distinguishing and explaining Fol-
lett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944), and Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943)).
58. See generally AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON SEC-
TARIAN SOCIAL SERVICES AND PUBLIC FUNDING (1990); Thomas W. Pickrell & Mitchell A.
Horwich, "Religion As an Engine of Civil Policy": A Comment on the First Amendment Limi-
tations on the Church-State Partnership in the Social Welfare Field, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1981, at 111; George H. Guilfoyle, Church-State Relations in Welfare, 3 CATH. LAW.
112 (1957); Timothy S. Burgett, Note, Government Aid to Religious Social Services Providers:
The Supreme Court's "Pervasively Sectarian" Standard, 75 VA. L. REV. 1077 (1989).
59. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1988). Two cases have reached the Supreme Court raising
First Amendment defenses to the application of the FUTA to religious organization; however,
neither case was decided on that issue. See California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393
(1982); St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981).
For cases in the lower courts raising the issue of whether the FUTA is unconstitutional
when applied to religious social services, see Terwilliger v. St. Vincent Infirmary Medical Ctr.,
804 S.W.2d 696 (Ark. 1991) (organization operated much as secular hospital, Catholic Medi-
cal Center is not exempt); Employment Div. v. Rogue Valley Youth for Christ, 770 P.2d 588
(Or. 1989) (state law exempting churches and church-run religious groups from paying FUTA
is unconstitutional); Kendall v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 473 N.E.2d 196
(Mass. 1985) (Catholic special education facility for developmentally disabled is exempt); Bap-
tist Children's Homes v. Employment See. Comm'n, 290 S.E.2d 402 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982)
(church need not pay tax for ordained minister who worked as house parent at children's
home); Bishop Leonard Regional Catholic Sch. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 593
A.2d 28 (Pa. Commw. 1991) (denial of unemployment compensation to teacher discharged for
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Labor Law Act;' (ii) the National Labor Relations Act;61 (iv) the Im-
migration Reform and Control Act;62 (v) the Social Security Act and
misconduct by Catholic school because she married a divorced non-Catholic does not violate
Establishment Clause). See generally Agatstein, Unemployment Insurance and the Religion
Clauses of the United States Constitution, 10 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. JUDGEs 63 (1990).
60. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988). In Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor,
471 U.S. 290 (1985), the Supreme Court upheld the application of the FLSA to a religious
organization. However, the activities held subject to the act were commercial in nature: ser-
vice stations, retail clothing and grocery outlets, hog farms, roofing and electrical contracting,
a record keeping company, a motel, and a candy business. Id at 291-92.
The minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the FLSA have been found applica-
ble to ministerial employees of church-affiliated schools. See DeArment v. Harvey, 932 F.2d
721 (8th Cir. 1991); Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir.), cert de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 131 (1990).
For cases in the lower courts raising the issue of whether the Child Labor Law Act is
unconstitutional when applied to religious social services, see McLaughlin v. McGee Bros.
Co., 681 F. Supp. 1117 (W.D.N.C. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Brock v. Wendell's Woodwork, Inc.,
867 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1989) (application of child labor laws to church's rehabilitation minis-
try for children not unconstitutional); Shiloh True Light Church of Christ v. Brock, 670 F.
Supp. 158 (W.D.N.C. 1987) (application of child labor laws to church's vocational training
program not unconstitutional).
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988). In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), the
Supreme Court held that the NLRA did not apply to parochial schools. While finding it
unnecessary to reach the issue, the Court said that NLRA application to lay teachers at a
parochial school would raise serious First Amendment questions. Id at 502, 504.
For cases in the lower courts raising the issue of whether the NLRA is unconstitutional
when applied to religious social services, see NLRB v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295 (9th
Cir. 1991) (residential home and school for boys owned by Catholic Church not exempt);
NLRB v. Kemmerer Village, Inc., 907 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1990) (foster home of Presbyterian
Church not exempt); Volunteers of America v. NLRB, 777 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1985) (alcohol-
ism services division of church not exempt); NLRB v. The Salvation Army of Massachusetts
Dorchester Day Care Ctr., 763 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985) (church-affiliated day care center not
exempt); Volunteers of America-Minnesota-Bar None Boys Ranch v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 345
(8th Cir.), cert denied, 472 U.S. 1028 (1985) (residential treatment and religious education
center not exempt); Denver Post of the Nat'l Soc'y. of the Volunteers of Am. v. NLRB, 732
F.2d 769 (10th Cir. 1984) (religious-affiliated medical center not exempt); St. Elizabeth Hosp.
v. NLRB, 715 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1983) (religious hospital not exempt); St. Elizabeth Commu-
nity Hosp. v. NLRB, 626 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1980), appeal after remand, 708 F.2d 1436 (9th
Cir. 1983) (Catholic hospital's prisoner ministry, youth recreational program, camps and re-
treats not exempt); Tressler Lutheran Home for Children v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 302 (3d Cir.
1982) (church-operated nursing home not exempt); NLRB v. St. Louis Christian Home, 663
F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1981) (church-affiliated residential treatment center for abused and neglected
children not exempt). See generally Ellyn S. Rosen, Note, Keeping the Camel's Nose Out of the
Tent: The Constitutionality of N.L.R.. Jurisdiction over Employees of Religious Institutions,
64 IND. L.J. 1015 (1989).
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (1986). For cases raising the issue of whether the Immigration Re-
form and Control Act is unconstitutional when applied to religious social services, especially
those working within the "sanctuary movement," see American Friends Serv. Comm. v.
Thornberg, 718 F. Supp. 820 (C.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd, 941 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1991) (Quaker
organization not exempt); Intercommunity Ctr. for Justice and Peace v. INS, 910 F.2d 42 (2d
Cir. 1990) (Catholic community center for justice and peace not exempt); American Baptist
Churches v. Meese, 666 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Cal. 1987) and 712 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal.
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ERISA;6 3 and (vi) the Occupational Safety and Health Act."4
Principal examples of the interaction of social ministries and federal
taxes, tax regulation and tax benefits are: (i) regulations governing the
lobbying and political activities of Internal Revenue Code Section
501(c)(3) organizations;65 (ii) the case law resisting the IRS requirement
to annually file Form 990;66 (iii) the Church Audit Procedures Act;67 and
1989) (First Amendment rights of sanctuary workers not violated); cf Presbyterian Church v.
United States, 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989), on remand, 752 F. Supp. 1505 (D. Ariz. 1990)
(investigative practices by INS agents violated First Amendment rights of churches suspected
of participating in sanctuary movement).
63. Under the Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 102(b)(1)(C),
(b)(2), 97 Stat. 70-71, and the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494,
churches became liable for the payment of social security taxes on their employees unless they
opted out within a statutorily defined period. In the event that a church chooses not to partici-
pate, its employees become subject to the social security tax at the self-employment rate. In
either instance, the church is required to withhold the tax and pay the appropriate funds to the
government. Prior to the amendments, nonprofit organizations including churches were auto-
matically excluded from social security participation unless they affirmatively elected to par-
ticipate.
In Bethel Baptist Church v. United States, 822 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 959 (1988), a church and its pastor, employees, and certain members, unsuccessfully chal-
lenged these amendments as violative of First Amendment rights. Relying on United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), the Court held that the government's compelling interest in main-
taining a sound revenue system outweighed religious liberty concerns.
Concerning the applicability of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988), to religious organizations, see Jack Myers, The Church Plan
Under Recent Pension Legislation, 27 CATH. LAW. 185 (1982); Thomas G. Tracy, Church
Plans, 60 TAXES 33 (1982).
64. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988). Depending on the nature of their activities, a religious
ministry may be subject to both federal and state-enacted job-safety legislation, e.g., a reli-
gious-affiliated employment center for the disabled or mentally retarded. The federal act ap-
plies to all corporations, including nonprofit corporations. 29 U.S.C. § 652. No exemptions
obtain for religious, education, or charitable corporations. The federal act applies to all em-
ployers "affecting commerce," 29 U.S.C. § 652(5), which evidences an intent to assert jurisdic-
tion to the fullest extent permitted by the Commerce Clause. OSHA imposes duties on
employers to follow applicable administrative regulations for their industry in order to provide
safe working conditions. Noncompliance with the regulations can result in judicial enforce-
ment proceedings and/or fines and imprisonment. A state may preempt the federal standards
on submission to and approval by the federal Secretary of Labor of a state plan of enforcement.
29 U.S.C. § 667.
65. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) imposes two restrictions on nonprofit, tax-exempt public charities,
including religious social ministries: First, a blanket prohibition on the organization's involve-
ment in political campaigns; and second, a requirement that no substantial part of its activities
be devoted to influencing legislation, i.e., lobbying. See LYNN R. BUZZARD & SHERRA
ROBINSON, I.R.S. POLITICAL AcTIVTrv RESTRICTIONS ON CHURCHES AND CHARITABLE
MINISTRIES (1990); Richard L. Haight, Lobbying for the Public Good: Limitations on Legisla-
tive Activities by Section 501(c)(3) Organizations, 23 GONZ. L. REv. 77 (1987); Wilfred R.
Caron & Deirdre Dessingue, IRC Sec. 501(c)(3): Practical and Constitutional Implications of
"Political"Activity Restrictions, 2 J.L. & POL. 169 (1985).
66. Under 26 U.S.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(i) and Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(5), an organization
is an "integrated auxiliary of a church" exempt from filing an informational return if it is (1)
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(iv) the utilization of IRC Sections 170 and 501(c)(3) to disfavor religious
organizations acting contrary to "public policy."1
68
Principal examples of the interaction of social ministries and federal
legislation prohibiting discrimination in employment and public accom-
modations are: (i) Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;69 (ii)
tax exempt, (2) affiliated with a church, and (3) its principal activity is exclusively religious.
Under Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(5)(ii), "[ain organization's principal activity will not be con-
sidered to be exclusively religious if that activity is educational, literary, charitable, or of an-
other nature (other than religious) that would serve as a basis for exemption under section [26
U.S.C.] § 501(c)(3)."
The courts have rejected, as inconsistent with congressional intent, the IRS view stated
above that religious charities cannot be "exclusively religious." See Tennessee Baptist Chil-
dren's Home, Inc. v. United States, 790 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1986) (church-affiliated tax-exempt
charity can be "exclusively religious integrated auxiliary" exempt from annual filing of infor-
mational Form 990); Lutheran Children & Family Serv. v. United States, 1986 WestLaw 7834
(E.D. Pa. 1986) (same); Lutheran Social Serv. v. United States, 758 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir. 1985),
on remand, 583 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Minn. 1986) (same). See generally Edward Gaffhey, Gov-
ernmental Definition of Religion: The Rise and Fall of the IRS Regulations on an "Integrated
Auxilliary of a Church," 25 VAL. U. L. REv. 203 (1991).
67. 26 U.S.C. § 7611 (1988). See JAMES E. GUINN, CHURCH AUDITS UNDER THE 1984
TAX REFORM AcT, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 3063-3691 (1985).
68. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), in which the Supreme
Court upheld the IRS's revocation of the tax-exempt status of a religious university and a
church-affiliated primary and secondary school because of their racially discriminatory prac-
tices. Without explicit statutory authorization from Congress, the IRS had issued a revenue
ruling stating that continued exemption of private, racially discriminatory schools was inimical
to "public policy." Id. at 579. In an extended discussion, the Court held that the IRS's ruling
was a fair interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, id. at 585-99, and in accord with the
wishes of Congress despite its inaction on the matter, id. at 599-603. Concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment, Justice Powell wrote separately to express his concern that tax
benefits should not be used to impose on nonprofit organizations a requirement of fidelity to
government orthodoxy, id. at 606-09, and to object to the notion that the IRS "is invested with
authority to decide which public policies are sufficiently 'fundamental' to require denial of tax
exemptions," id. at 611.
Notwithstanding the agreed finding of fact that the discriminatory practices of the two
schools arose out of religious beliefs, the Court held that a compelling interest in eradicating
racism in education overcame any Free Exercise or Establishment Clause defenses. Id. at 602-
03, 603 nn.29-30.
The IRS continues to enforce revenue procedures setting forth guidelines for determining
whether a private school or preschool - including those that are church related - are engag-
ing in racial discrimination. Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834; Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B.
587. Each school must certify annually to the IRS that it has satisfied certain requirements
directed at preventing racial discrimination. This is accomplished on form 5578.
69. Title II is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-a-6 (1988), and Title VII is codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-e-17 (1988). In Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), the Supreme Court held that § 702 of Title
VII did not violate the Establishment Clause. Section 702 exempts religious organizations
from the prohibition on religious discrimination in employment.
For lower court cases involving the First Amendment and discrimination by religious
social services, see Speer v. Presbyterian Children's Home & Serv. Agency, 55 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 40,512 (Tex. D. Ct. 1990) (children's home does not waive § 702 exemption by
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the Equal Pay Act of 1963;7o (iii) the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1975;71 and (iv) the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990.72
In terms of complexity and probable future expansion, by far the
more interesting religious liberty issues arise when pursuant to its spend-
ing power, the federal government enacts programs providing benefits to
private-sector social service agencies. Over 350 federal statutory pro-
grams provide aid to private-sector organizations through grants, con-
tracts, or cooperative agreements.73 The social ministries of religious
bodies are presumptively eligible to participate in many of these pro-
grams.' Each program's benefits are accompanied by regulatory bur-
dens. Of course, all such programs require the private-sector agencies to
hiring members of different religious denomination); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyte-
rian Hosps., 736 F. Supp. 1018 (E.D. Mo. 1990), aff'd, 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991) (discharge
of chaplain, a female priest, not actionable against religious hospital under Title VII and Age
Discrimination Act); Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987), reh'g
denied, 840 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1988) (dismissal of a pregnant, single employee for violating
girls club's "role model rule" not violative of Title VII); Ninth & 0 Street Baptist Church v.
EEOC, 616 F. Supp. 1231 (W.D. Ky. 1985) (EEOC may conduct investigation into discrimi-
nation charge at church child-care center); Fike v. United Methodist Children's Home, Inc.,
493 F. Supp. 935 (E.D. Va. 1980), rev'd, 660 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1981), and summary judgment
on remand, 547 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Va. 1982), and aff'd, 709 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1983) (chil-
dren's home replacement of executive director with ordained minister not Title VII violation).
See generally Laycock, supra note 28; Mark F. Kohler, Comment, Equal Employment or Ex-
cessive Entanglement? The Application of Employment Discrimination Statutes to Religiously
Affiliated Organizations, 18 CONN. L. Rnv. 581 (1986).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988). There are no reported cases involving a religious social
ministries clashing with the Equal Pay Act of 1963. For cases involving the First Amendment
and discrimination by church-based schools, see Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d
1389 (4th Cir.), and cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 131 (1990) ("head of household" allowance for
married, male teachers with dependent children, but not for similarly situated females, violates
act); EEOC v. Tree of Life Christian Schs., 751 F. Supp. 700 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (same).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1988). For cases involving the First Amendment and age
discrimination by religious social ministries, see Lukaszewski v. Nazareth Hosp., 764 F. Supp.
57 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (First Amendment not violated by application of act to religious hospital);
Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 736 F. Supp. 1018 (E.D. Mo. 1990),
aff'd, 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991) (discharge of chaplain, a female priest, not actionable
against religious hospital under Title VII and Age Discrimination Act); cf Cochran v. St.
Louis Preparatory Seminary, 717 F. Supp. 1413 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (act cannot be applied to
seminary).
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 1991). The act exempts religious organizations
from its title prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations. Id § 12187. Although not
exempt from the act's title prohibiting discrimination in employment, religious entities may
have religious preferences and require employees to follow its religious tenets. Id § 12113(c).
73. Michael W. McCoanell, Political and Religious Disestablishment, 1986 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 405, 420-21.
74. See id. at 421-29; Burgett, supra note 58, at 1081-87; Bill to Provide for Judicial Review
of the Constitutionality of Grants or Loans Under Certain Acts: Hearings on S. 2097 Before the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
699-716 (1968) (noting welfare programs that may provide benefits to religious social services).
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account for the use of public moneys or the proper utilization of an in-
kind transfer of goods. Often, however, the regulations are more perva-
sive: moving from the noncontroversial health and safety standards; pro-
gressing on to nondiscrimination requirements as to employees and
individuals served by the social service agency; and, most meddlesome, to
various degrees of control over the curriculum or program content of-
fered by the religious ministry as it meets the temporal needs of its clien-
tele. An additional complexity is introduced when the federal legislation
involves state and local governments in both revenue sharing and the
regulatory oversight of the private-sector programs.
1. Supreme Court Cases on Aid to Social Ministries
Although the Supreme Court, with limited exceptions, has blocked
most forms of government spending on primary and secondary schools
operated by religious organizations,75 this has not been the pattern con-
cerning government aid to church-affiliated institutions of higher educa-
tion.7 6 The Court has found most primary and secondary schools to be
"pervasively sectarian," whereas church-related colleges generally are
not.7 7 Hence, church secondary schools generally cannot receive govern-
75. The Court struck down government aid in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)
(public school teachers providing remedial education and attendant materials at religious
school campus); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (public instructional equipment);
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (counseling and special education services provided at
religious school campus; loan of instructional equipment); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Relig.
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (grants for building maintenance; tuition grants to
parents; tuition tax credits); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (tuition reimbursement);
Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Relig. Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (reimbursement for
cost of teacher-prepared testing and record keeping required by law); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971) (teacher salary supplement; cash reimbursement for textbooks).
The Supreme Court has upheld state aid to primary and secondary religious schools in
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (tuition tax deductions); Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Relig. Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (subsidy for state-prepared testing and record
keeping required by law); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (textbooks; standardized
tests and scoring services; diagnostic services on campus with therapeutic services to follow off-
campus if indicated); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (loan of textbooks); Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbooks); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(reimbursement for bus transportation).
76. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (plurality opinion); Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
77. In Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 758-59 (1976) (plurality opinion),
the Supreme Court turned back a challenge to the constitutionality of a state funding program
that afforded noncategorical grants to eligible colleges and universities, including sectarian
institutions that awarded more than just seminarian or theological degrees. In discussion fo-
cused on the fostering of religion, the Supreme Court said:
[T]he primary-effect question is the substantive one of what private educational activ-
ities, by whatever procedure, may be supported by state funds. [Hunt v. McNair,
413 U.S. 734 (1973)] requires (1) that no state aid at all go to institutions that are so
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ment aid, for these schools exist to propagate the faith. Interestingly,
when the government benefit to primary and secondary schools is di-
rected to parents or students, as opposed to aid given directly to the reli-
gious school, the Court has recently upheld the governmental program.7"
Unlike the many lawsuits concerning church-affiliated schools, the
Supreme Court has reviewed only two cases challenging the constitution-
ality of a welfare program that benefitted, inter alia, a religious social
ministry.79 In Bradfield v. Roberts,"' a corporation located in the Dis-
trict of Columbia known as Providence Hospital was chartered in 1864
by act of Congress. The legislation establishing the corporation was
facially neutral in that it made no mention of religion, nor was the hospi-
"pervasively sectarian" that secular activities cannot be separated from sectarian
ones, and (2) that if secular activities can be separated out, they alone may be funded.
Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755 (emphasis in original).
The Baptist college in Hunt and the Roman Catholic colleges in Roemer were held not to
be "pervasively sectarian." The record in Roemer supported findings that the institutions em-
ployed chaplains who held worship services on campus, taught mandatory religious classes,
and started some classes with prayer. However, there was a high degree of autonomy from the
Roman Catholic Church, the faculty was not hired on a religious basis and had complete
academic freedom except in religious classes, and students were chosen without regard to their
religion. The challenged state aid in Hunt was for the construction of secular college facilities.
The legislation granted the authority to issue revenue bonds. The Court upheld the legislation,
commenting on the primary-effect test:
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion when it
flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of
its functions are subsumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifically
religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting.
Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743
A comparison of the colleges in Roemer and Hunt with the elementary and secondary
schools in Committee for Pub. Educ. & Reig. Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 767-68 (1973),
will help to clarify the term "pervasively religious." The parochial schools in Nyquist, found to
be pervasively religious, conformed to the following profile: the schools placed religious re-
strictions on student admissions and faculty appointments, they enforced obedience to reli-
gious dogma, they required attendance at religious services, they required religious or doctrinal
study, they were an integral part of the religious mission of the sponsoring church, they had
religious indoctrination as a primary purpose, and they imposed religious restrictions on how
and what the faculty could teach. The state aid in Nyquist was held to be prohibited by the
Establishment Clause.
78. See Witters v. Washington Dep't. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller
v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). But cf Commit-
tee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
79. For commentary on the controversy created when the Kennedy administration's
Peace Corps and the Johnson administration's anti-poverty programs announced that they
would allow religious agencies to participate in these programs, see LEo PFEFFER, CHURCH,
STATE AND FREEDOM 202-05 (rev. ed. 1967); Robert R. Sullivan, The Politics ofAltruism: The
American Church-State Conflicts in the Food-for-Peace Program, 11 J. CHURCH & ST. 47
(1969).
80. 175 U.S. 291 (1899). See generally Ralph L. Block, Comment, Hospital Aid and the
Establishment Clause: Conflict or Accommodation?, 13 UCLA L. REv. 1100 (1966).
Winter 19921
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
tal ostensibly controlled by or associated with a church. Nevertheless, all
of the directors of the hospital and their successors were "composed of
members of a monastic order or sisterhood of the Roman Catholic
Church,""1 and title to the real estate on which the hospital buildings
were constructed was "vested in the Sisters of Charity of Emmitsburg,
Maryland." 2 Federal taxpayers challenged as violative of the Establish-
ment Clause an 1897 congressional appropriation to build on the hospital
grounds "an isolating building or ward for the treatment of minor conta-
gious diseases," 83 that when completed was to be turned over to Provi-
dence Hospital. This arrangement, alleged plaintiffs, was an instance
where "public funds are being used and pledged for the advancement and
support of a private and sectarian corporation."84 For consideration of
only the question before it, the Supreme Court assumed that a capital
appropriation to a religious corporation would violate the Establishment
Clause. Assuming, arguendo, that this was a correct statement of law,
the Court said plaintiffs' allegations nonetheless failed to show that Prov-
idence Hospital was a religious or sectarian body. Merely because the
board of directors was entirely composed of members of the same reli-
gion did not make the hospital religious. Without additional evidence,
the Court was unwilling to assume that Providence Hospital would act
otherwise than in accord with its legal charter, wherein its powers by all
appearances were secular, having to do with the care of the injured and
infirm. Although plaintiffs alleged that the hospital's business was "con-
ducted under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church," there was no
evidence that management of the business was limited to members of that
faith or that the work of the hospital was limited to Roman Catholics.85
Accordingly, Bradfield turned on the inadequacies of plaintiffs' pleadings
and a formalistic view of the importance of separate incorporation
through a charter worded in religiously neutral terms, even though the
corporation had de facto an interlocking directorate with a religious
order.
In Bowen v. Kendrick,86 by the narrow margin of 5 to 4, the Court
sustained the "facial" constitutionality of The Adolescent Family Life
81. 175 U.S. at 297.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 293.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 298-99. See also Kentucky Bldg. Comm'n v. Effron, 220 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. 1949)
(holding that state grants to Episcopalian and Catholic hospitals do not violate state or federal
constitutions).
86. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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Act (AFLA).8 7 Under the AFLA, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (HHS) authorizes direct cash grants to both public and private
nonprofit organizations doing research or providing services in the areas
of teenage pregnancy and counseling to adolescents concerning premari-
tal sexual relations. Accordingly, the societal problem addressed by the
AFLA is a blend of health, economic, and moral issues surrounding pre-
marital sex and pregnancy out of wedlock. The statute defined an eligi-
ble grant recipient as a "public or non-profit private organization or
agency," apparently permitting otherwise qualified religious organiza-
tions to receive the grants on the same terms as secular agencies."8
Moreover, language in the act expressly invited participation by religious
organizations and required certain secular grantees to take into account
involvement of religious organizations along with family and community
volunteer groups in addressing the problem of adolescent sexuality.89
These provisions were written into the law to insure that religious groups
be treated in a nondiscriminatory manner when compared with other
similarly situated eligible grant recipients. No statutory language specifi-
cally barred the use of grant monies for worship, prayer, or other in-
trinsically religious activities. Finally, other than routine fiscal
accountability to ensure that federal funds were not misappropriated, no
monitoring or other oversight was entailed in the resulting relationship
between HHS and religious organizations.
After describing the broad outlines of the AFLA, the Court utilized
the three-prong Lemon test for its Establishment Clause analysis.9" A
statute must have, according to the first of the three requirements laid
down in Lemon, a "secular legislative purpose."9 1 The Supreme Court
will invalidate legislation under Lemon's first prong, only when it can be
said that the law's "pre-eminent purpose... is plainly religious in na-
ture"92 or when "it is motivated wholly by an impermissible purpose."93
The contending parties in Bowen v. Kendrick agreed "that, on the whole,
religious concerns were not the sole motivation behind the Act."94 As
87. 42 U.S.C. § 300z to z-10 (1988).
88. 487 U.S. at 593, 608-09.
89. Id at 595-96, 605-07.
90. Id at 602. See text accompanying supra note 30.
91. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 401 U.S. 602 (1971); see text accompanying supra note 30.
92. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam); see also Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 590 (1987) ("preeminent religious purpose"); id at 605 ("interference with the
decisions of these authorities [school boards] is warranted only when the purpose for their
decisions is clearly religious") (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
93. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 602 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) ("moti-
vated wholly by religious considerations")).
94. Id at 602-03.
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has become normal in its approach, 95 the Court's application of the pur-
pose test was highly deferential to the legislature. Because a plausible,
nonreligious purpose appeared on the face of the challenged legislation,
the Court was inclined summarily to announce this element of the test
satisfied and move quickly on to the second and third factors in Lemon.96
Lemon's second prong requires that the "principal or primary ef-
fect" of a law or governmental policy "must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion." 97 The Supreme Court has sustained the constitu-
tionality of laws that have only an incidental or de minimis effect of ad-
vancing religion. 98 When religion is materially advanced by legislation,
albeit unintentionally, the effect or impact presumably would be apparent
from the day-to-day operation of the act. That is, in a straightforward
application of the effect test, the Court requires measurable, palpable evi-
dence tendered by the plaintiff that a religion, or religion generally, has
been advanced. However, where the recipient of a governmental benefit
is "pervasively sectarian," the Court has been willing to infer or assume
that the impact of the benefit program will be to materially advance reli-
gion.99 This, of course, gives the effect prong a preemptive strike capabil-
ity. Even though no actual advancement of religion has been shown by
the evidence, the mere presence of such a hazard is sufficient to strike
down the legislation. The Court's definition of a "pervasively sectarian"
institution has been stated in general terms, but only church-affiliated
primary and secondary schools have ever been found by the Supreme
Court to fit the profile. (Presumably, a church, synagogue, or mosque
would also be regarded as "pervasively sectarian.")
95. In addition to the cases cited supra notes 92-93, see Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987)
(the test is not that a "law's purpose must be unrelated to religion," for that would require
government to "show a callous indifference to religious groups" (citation omitted)); Wallace v.
Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) ("a statute that is motivated in part by a religious purpose" does
not violate the purpose prong).
96. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 602-04. The Supreme Court has in most cases easily found a
permissible purpose in a statute's language, its legislative history, or simply by exercising com-
mon sense. The dissenting Justices acceded to this approach in Bowen, id. at 634, in which
Justice Blackmun stated: "As is often the case, it is the effect of the statute, rather than its
purpose, that creates Establishment Clause problems.... I have no meaningful disagreement
with the majority's discussion of the AFLA's essentially secular purpose."
97. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612; see text accompanying supra note 30.
98. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (freedom of speech rights require a
state university to afford equal access to student religious groups, and such utilization of gov-
ernment facilities has no religious effect other than "incidental").
99. See School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385, 387 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229, 254 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370, 372 (1975); Levitt v. Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Relig. Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973).
Critical to the result in Bowen v. Kendrick was that the majority
refused to find that religiously based teenage counseling centers were nec-
essarily "pervasively sectarian. ' '" °° There was nothing "inherently reli-
gious," pointed out the Court, about the activities and services provided
by the grantees to adolescents with premarital sexuality questions and
problems. 1 ' Simply because the AFLA expressly required that religious
organizations be considered among the available grantees and that they
be taken into account by secular grantees, did not have the effect of en-
dorsing a religious view of how to solve the problem.10 2 The Court saw
Congress as neutral with respect to grantee status when Congress simply
required that all organizations, secular or religious, be considered on an
equal footing. The law did not violate the Establishment Clause merely
because religious teachings and the moral values urged by the AFLA
overlap.10 3 Moreover, that the form of the governmental benefit was a
direct cash grant did not, so long as the organization was not "perva-
sively sectarian," offend the First Amendment." 4 Finally, that the ulti-
mate clientele the act sought to help were impressionable adolescents, did
not without more, present an unacceptable risk that the Establishment
Clause was violated. 0 5
Although the AFLA had no express statutory bar to the use of fed-
eral funds for worship, prayer, or other inherently religious activities, the
Court did warn that "we have said that the Establishment Clause does
'prohibit government-financed or government-sponsored indoctrination
into the beliefs of a particular religious faith.' "106 No such danger ex-
isted here, thought the Court, because the grantees were not necessarily
"pervasively sectarian."
In evaluating the third prong of Lemon, the Court examines
whether the statute in question fosters an excessive administrative entan-
glement between the institutions of religion and the offices of govern-
ment. 10 7 The prohibition on excessive entanglement is rooted, inter alia,
in the duty to safeguard "the freedom of even the adherents of the de-
nomination [supported by the law from being] limited by the governmen-
tal intrusion into sacred matters."108  In Bowen v. Kendrick, the
100. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 610-11. See Burgett, supra note 58 (critical of Bowen's application
of "pervasively sectarian" analysis to social services).
101. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 604-05, 613.
102. Ia at 605-06.
103. Id at 606-07.
104. Id at 606, 608.
105. Id at 611-12.
106. Id at 611 (quoting School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985)).
107. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613; see text accompanying supra note 30.
108. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 410 (1985).
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monitoring by HHS of the AFLA grantees was necessary only to ensure
that federal money not be misappropriated. There was no requirement
that religious grantees follow any federal guidelines concerning the con-
tent of the advice given teenagers, not discriminate as to the clientele
they served, or otherwise modify their values or program. Because reli-
gious grantees were not necessarily "pervasively sectarian," the majority
held that this limited monitoring by HHS could not be said to be uncon-
stitutionally entangling. 109
Central to the AFLA not being facially unconstitutional was the
Court's finding that religious grantees are not necessarily pervasively sec-
tarian. However, the matter was remanded for a case-by-case analysis
concerning each religious grantee. 110 As to each grantee, the AFLA "as
applied" might violate the Establishment Clause, and such would be true
particularly if the grantee in question matched a pervasively sectarian
profile. Dividing the analysis between "facial" and "as applied" places a
considerable burden on strict separationists - at least insofar as they
rely on the effect and entanglement prongs of Lemon - because a strict
separationist agenda to halt government aid can be advanced in the
courts only on a piecemeal or case-by-case basis. Henceforth, a violation
of the effect and entanglement prongs must be buttressed by palpable
evidence (not a mere "risk") that religion is being advanced - the only
exception being pervasively sectarian, church-affiliated primary and sec-
ondary schools. As a consequence of Bowen v. Kendrick, it appears that
government aid to social service ministries can be struck down only on
an "as applied" basis. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice
O'Connor warns that evidence of a pattern or practice of HHS disregard
of Establishment Clause concerns would, in her view, be cause for over-
turning the entire AFLA as the appropriate remedy. 1 '
2. Federal Spending Legislation and Social Ministries
In its language, federal welfare legislation often takes into account
that some of the private sector organizations receiving financial assist-
ance will be religious ministries. These provisions may be usefully organ-
ized around five types of express terms: (1) statutory restrictions that are
a complete bar to benefits going to a religious organization; (2) statutory
restrictions on benefits being utilized in a facility that is not a "religiously
109. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 615-17.
110. Id. at 620-22. Following remand to proceed with the plaintiffs' attack on the AFLA
"as applied," the district court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment because there
remained genuine issues of fact for trial. Kendrick v. Sullivan, 766 F. Supp. 1180 (D.D.C.
1991).
111. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 623-24.
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neutral" site; (3) statutory restrictions on benefits being utilized for wor-
ship, prayer, or other inherently sectarian purposes; (4) statutory restric-
tions on recipients discriminating as to their employees; and (5) statutory
restrictions on recipients discriminating as to the persons whom the fed-
eral welfare program ultimately seeks to help.
The Hill-Burton Act"1 2 is a federal program designed to improve the
standards of medical care in the United States by subsidizing the cost of
hospital construction. Both public and private hospitals are eligible re-
cipients, including hospitals that are religiously affiliated. When a hospi-
tal has obtained a certificate of need from state authorities indicating that
a modernization or expansion of facilities is warranted, the hospital may
apply to federal authorities for a construction grant. The construction of
buildings is generally restricted to facilities that have a secular use. How-
ever, there is provision for a "retiring room" in general hospitals, which
would be a room suitable for quite meditation, worship or prayer.1 3
Further, a chapel, altar, and offices for clerics are permitted in mental
hospitals."' These provisions in the Hill-Burton Act have not been liti-
gated."' 5 Nonetheless, the general restriction that construction grants be
utilized to build only secular facilities is in line with the Supreme Court
cases having to do with aid to institutions of higher education.
'1 6
Aid to hospital centers for medical education and research con-
ducted outside of the United States, where the facility is founded by or
sponsored by United States citizens, is available under the American
112. The full title of the Hill-Burton Act is the Hospital Survey and Construction Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 291 to 291o-1 (1988). For commentary concerning the level of religious participa-
tion in Hill-Burton grants, see COUGHLIN, supra note 15, at 69-74; PFEFFER, supra note 79, at
200-02.
113. 42 C.F.R. § 53 App. A, Sec. III B-I (1949).
114. 42 C.F.R. § 53 App. A, See. III B-3.
115. The Hill-Burton Act was amended to give religious hospitals the right to refuse a
patient's request for an abortion or sterilization operation. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (1988). Chal-
lenges that this provision "favors" religion and is thus violative of the Establishment Clause
have been rejected. Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 948 (1976); Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974);
see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197-98 (1973); Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756
(7th Cir. 1973); Allen v. Sisters of St. Joseph, 361 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Tex. 1973), appeal
dismissed, 490 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1974); Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 364 F. Supp. 799
(D. Idaho 1973).
116. See supra notes 76-77; see also Wisconsin ex rel. Wisc. Health Facilities Auth. v. Lind-
ner, 280 N.W.2d 773 (Wis. 1979) (wherein a Catholic hospital successfully proved that its
operation is not so religiously pervasive that state aid in the form of tax-exempt bonding au-
thority ran afoul of the Establishment Clause); Truitt v. Board of Pub. Works, 221 A.2d 370
(Md. 1966) (Hill-Burton funding of religious hospital not violative of state constitution); Aber-
nathy v. City of Irvine, 355 S.W.2d 159 (Ky. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 831 (1962) (same);
Craig v. Mercy Hospital-Street Memorial, 45 So. 2d 809 (Miss. 1950) (same); Kentucky Bldg.
Comm'n v. Effron, 220 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. 1949) (same).
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Schools and Hospitals Abroad Program (ASHA). 117 The ASHA was
designed to assist developing countries acquire funding for schools and
medical centers that serve as demonstration projects for American ideas
and practices. The program is administered by the Agency for Interna-
tional Development (AID), which awards grants to sponsoring institu-
tions or individuals in the United States. Funds are then transferred by
the sponsor to the foreign school or hospital. AID criteria require that
the overseas school or hospital be open to all persons without discrimina-
tion, and that assistance may not be used to train persons for religious
pursuits or to construct facilities for worship.'l I However, the criteria do
not bar religiously affiliated schools or hospital from grants." 9
A recent tangle between Congress and the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) generated one of the more revealing
social services funding debates. The Emergency Shelter Grants Program
(ESGP) was adopted by Congress in October 1986.2 ° The 1986 ESGP
authorized HUD to make grants to private, nonprofit organizations for
the rehabilitation or conversion of buildings for use as emergency shelters
for the homeless, and for the payment of certain operating and social
service expenses in connection with the operation of homeless shelters.
In December 1986, HUD issued proposed regulations concerning the ad-
ministration of the grants. 121 Buildings owned by churches and other
"primarily religious organizations" were completely prohibited from re-
ceiving funds to renovate, rehabilitate, or convert their buildings for
homeless shelters.' 22
In early 1987, Congress had before it consideration of the Stewart B.
McKinney Homeless Assistance Act, ultimately approved by the Presi-
dent in July 1987.123 Subtitle B of the McKinney Act modified the
117. 22 U.S.C. § 2174(b) (1988). The ASHA is part of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
as amended, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2429a (1991).
118. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,543, 67,544 (1979).
119. See Lamont v. Schultz, 748 F. Supp. 1043 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, sub nom Lamont v.
Woods, 948 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1991). In Lamont federal taxpayers challenged the ASHA grant
program's funding of 20 overseas schools with religious affiliation as violative of the Establish-
ment Clause. The district court entered an interlocutory order concluding that the ASHA was
subject to the three-part Lemon test notwithstanding that the schools operated overseas. The
order was also certified for interlocutory appeal and later affirmed. Lamont did not challenge
funding to religious hospital centers overseas. See generally J. BRUCE NICHOLS, THE UNEASY
ALLIANCE: RELIGION, REFUGEE WORK, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1988).
120. The 1986 ESGP is found in Part C, Title V of HUD's appropriation for Fiscal Year
1987. Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 10(g) (approved Oct. 18, 1986).
121. 51 Fed. Reg. 45,277 (1986).
122. Id. at 45,283.
123. Stewart B. McKinney Homelessness Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. (101 Stat.) 482.
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ESGP of the prior year.12 4 In considering the 1987 ESGP legislation,
Congress sharply criticized HUD's proposed restrictions placed on
grants to religious organizations.' 25 The committee report in the House
of Representatives indicated that HUD was to administer both the 1986
and 1987 ESGP in a manner permitting participation by religious organi-
zations. The committee report stated that federal funds under the 1986
Act should be made available to religious organizational recipients under
the following conditions:
-No person applying for funded services shall be discrimi-
nated against on the basis of religion.
-No religious instruction or counselling, and no religious
worship will be provided in connection with the provision of secu-
lar non-religious assistance.
-No sectarian or religious symbols may be used in the por-
tion of the facility used to provide secular services unless such said
symbols had been previously permanently affixed to the facility.
-All federal funds must be accounted for separately from all
other funds of the institution so that the federal government will
not have to monitor the general accounts of the religious
organization.
-Any real property that is owned by a religious organization
or an organization with religious affiliation and rehabilitated with
federal funds must be dedicated solely to secular purposes.... If
the property reverts to sectarian use, the grant amount must be
repaid. 
12 6
Additionally, Congress indicated that religious grant recipients
could discriminate as to their employees to the extent permitted by Sec-
tion 702 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.' 27 In
accordance with this expression of congressional disapproval, HUD did
issue final regulations in October 1987 that eased the restrictions on fed-
eral grants to religious ministries. 128 The final rules permitted religious
organizations to create separate corporate shells that are de jure secular
to receive the HUD grants. This creates a formalistic barrier to the re-
ceipt of government funds by religion, but it is of questionable utility in
terms of church-state.separation requirements and may needlessly raise
the administrative cost of achieving eligibility status.
124. The McKinney ESGP is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11371-11378 (Law. Co-op 1989 &
Supp. 1991).
125. H.R. REP. No. 10(I), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
362, 369-71.
126, Id. at 370.
127. Id. at 371.
128. 52 Fed. Reg. 38,863 (1987).
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In its definitional section of "private non-profit organizations" eligi-
ble to receive grants, the McKinney 1987 ESGP placed additional re-
strictions on grantees. To be eligible, a private organization has to have
Section 501(c) status under the Internal Revenue Code, have an account-
ing system and voluntary board, and practice nondiscrimination as to the
individuals the program ultimately sought to served. 2 ' The final ar-
rangement between HUD and Congress, then, focused simultaneously on
the de jure nature of the religious agency serving the needs of the home-
less, the type of social problem the program addressed, and the temporal
nature of the services provided to the homeless.
The Child and Adult Care Food Program l"' of the National School
Lunch Act,"' authorizes assistance to states who in turn help maintain
grants-in-aid and other programs providing nutritious food to child-care
centers, after-school-hours care centers, and adult care centers. Centers
and programs operated by religious organizations are presumptively eli-
gible to participate. However, any such center must be licensed or ap-
proved by the state in which it is operating, meet a plethora of minimal
standards touching on health, safety, fire codes, staffing, and staff train-
ing, and not discriminate as to the center's employees or the persons the
nutritional program ultimately seeks to serve.
132
Contrast the regulations governing the Child and Adult Care Food
Program, as administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA), with HUD's administration of the Emergency Shelter Grant
Program. HUD's regulations have numerous provisions expressly deal-
ing with the manner in which religious organizations may use the federal
grants. HUD imposes few health or safety standards on homeless shel-
ters, however, and only requires that there be no discrimination as to the
persons the federal aid ultimately seeks to serve. In contrast, the USDA
is silent as to whether any of its grant recipients may be affiliated with
religious organizations, nor are there any mandates that monies be spent
only for secular purposes. The USDA, however, has a plethora of mini-
mal regulations going far beyond health, fire, and safety - matters usu-
ally left to state regulation - and requires nondiscrimination as to both
persons served and the employees of any child-care or adult care pro-
gram. But HUD, unlike the USDA, requires a separate corporate shell,
a voluntary board, and a separate accounting system. These very differ-
129. 42 U.S.C.S. § 11371(5) (Law. Co-op. 1989). See Mark Chopko, Intentional Values
and the Public Interest-A Plea for Consistency in Church/State Relations, 39 DEPAUL L.
REv. 1143, 1179 (1990).
130. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1766, 1766a (West Supp. 1991).
131. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1751-1769 (West Supp. 1991).
132. See 7 C.F.R. pt. 226 (1991) (especially § 226.6).
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ent approaches can hardly be explained in terms of First Amendment
requirements.
The federal government's newest foray into social services is provi-
sion of benefits to child day-care facilities. The Child Care and Develop-
ment Block Grant Act of 1990,111 provides for both capital improvement
grants to eligible facilities and child-care certificates (vouchers) to low-
income parents. Concerning capital improvement grants, a "sectarian
agency or organization" is ineligible if such monies are to be used for the
purchase or improvement of land or for the purchase, construction, or
permanent improvement of any building or facility. The only exception
is where the grant to the sectarian agency is "necessary to bring the facil-
ity.., into compliance with health and safety requirements."' 134
Notwithstanding the unrestricted use to which a parent may elect to
tender a voucher to the child-care facility of his or her choice, including a
religiously affiliated one,1 35 acceptance of the federal voucher by a child-
care facility thereby entails an assurance of compliance with certain fed-
eral standards. 36 A child-care facility must be licensed or otherwise reg-
istered as required by state law, 137 and state health and safety regulationminimally must assure compliance as to the prevention and control of
infectious diseases (including immunization), building and physical
premises safety, and minimum health and safety training of the staff as
133. Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 508, § 5082, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 1388-236 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9858-9858p). The Child
Care Act is part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, §§ 5081-5082, Pub. L.
No. 508, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 1388. On June 6, 1991, the Department of Health and
Human Services issued interim final rules concerning the Child Care Act. See 56 Fed. Reg.
26,193-26,240 (1991) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 98, 99).
See generally John W. Whitehead, Accommodation and Equal Treatment of Religion:
Federal Funding of Religiously-Affiliated Child Care Facilities, 26 HARV. 3. ON LEGIS. 573
(1989); Greg J. Matis, Comment, Dilemma in Day Care: The Virtues ofAdministrative Accom-
modation, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 573 (1990).
134. § 658F(b), 104 Stat. at 1388-240 to -241 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 9858d).
135. In stark contrast to capital improvement grants, child-care vouchers available to low-
income parents are fairly unrestricted should the parents choose to enroll their child in a
religious facility. Section 658P(2), which defines the "child care certificate" or voucher, states
that "[n]othing... shall preclude the use of such certificates for sectarian child care services if
freely chosen by the parent." This is reinforced by section 658M(a) which states: "[n]o finan-
cial assistance ... pursuant to the choice of a parent under section 658E(c)(2)(A)(i)(I) or
through any other grant under contract of the State plan, shall be expended for any sectarian
purpose or activity, including sectarian worship or instruction." That language is couched in
the negative, but its failure to cross-reference a parent's free use of the child-care certificate in
section 658E(c)(2)(A)(i)(II) is intentional. See also 56 Fed. Reg. 26,229 (1991) (to be codified
at 45 C.F.R. § 98.30). It is thereby clear that there is no limit on the use to which a religious
organization can put monies received from a parent tendering a child-care voucher.
136. 55 Fed. Reg. 26,230 (1991) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. § 98.41(a)).
137. Id at 26,229-30 (to be codified at §§ 98.40, .45).
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appropriate to the setting. 138 Moreover, an appropriate state agency
must insure that parents have ready access to the center to visit their
children and speak with the child's care provider, and the state agency
must maintain a record of substantiated parental complaints that is to be
available for public inspection.
1 39
Most intrusive into the operation of a religious child-care facility,
acceptance of federal grants (but not child-care vouchers) requires com-
pliance with rules prohibiting discrimination on the basis of religion both
as to the children served by the facility and employees who are working
directly with the children."4 Although the act does not specifically ad-
dress the matter, acceptance of capital improvements grants (but not
child-care vouchers) makes a child-care facility a recipient of "Federal
financial assistance" under federal civil rights legislation, thereby invok-
ing nondiscrimination requirements on the basis of race, national origin,
138. Child Care and Development Block Grant of 1990, Pub. L. No. 508, § 658E(c)(2)(F),
104 Stat. at 1388-239 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9858c). See also 56 Fed. Reg. 26,230
(1991) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 98.41).
139. Pub. L. No. 508, § 658E(c)(2)(B) and (C), 104 Stat. at 1388-238 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 9858c). See also 56 Fed. Reg. 26,229 (1991) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 98.31, -
.32).
140. § 658N(a), 104 Stat. at 1388-245 to -246 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9852). See also
56 Stat. Fed. Reg. 26,230-31 (1991) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 98.46, -.47). The distinc-
tion between block grants and child care certificates or vouchers is intentional, as explained by
H1-1S:
[Slections 658E(c)(2)(E) and (F) require Grantees to provide assurances concerning
any applicable licensing and regulatory requirements and concerning health and
safety requirements applicable to child care providers that provide services for which
assistance is made available under the Act. This formulation was used to ensure that
such requirements were triggered, not only by assistance to providers, i.e., grants and
contracts, but also by assistance to parents, i.e., certificates. By contrast, the provi-
sions of section 658N of the Act relating to nondiscrimination in employment and
enrollment on the basis of religion apply for the most part to "[a] child care provider
* * * that receives assistance under this subchapter." Thus, such requirements are
only triggered by assistance to the provider in the form of grants, contracts, and
loans.
The above distinction, which we have followed in the structure and terminology
of the regulations, reflects the compromise embodied in the Act between licensing
and regulatory requirements and health and safety requirements, on the one hand,
and religious nondiscrimination and nonsectarian use requirements, on the other.
Although the Act requires all providers to comply with the former, providers who
accept only certificates need comply with the latter only when 80 percent or more of
their operating budget is governmental, as discussed in §§ 98.46 and 98.47. This
distinction follows the Act by providing parental choice of sectarian providers, and
by protecting the religious autonomy of such providers.
56 Fed. Reg. 26,198 (1991).
There are exceptions to the general rule of nondiscrimination on the basis of religion.
Concerning employees, the facility may require compliance with religious teachings and rules
forbidding use of drugs and alcohol. § 658N(a)(1)(B), 104 Stat. at 1388-245 (to be codified at
42 U.S.C. § 98581). Concerning children not funded by vouchers, facilities may favor families
that regularly attend the church. § 658N(a)(2)(B).
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age, and handicap.1 4 1
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and similar
legislation at the state level prohibit many forms of employment discrimi-
nation by social service ministries. Title VII prohibits employers of 15 or
more employees from discriminating in its employment practices on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.142 However, Section
702 of Title VII 143 permits a religious organization to discriminate on the
basis of religion with respect to its employees. Religious discrimination
is lawful whether or not the particular job in question is one held by a
cleric or primarily entails sectarian duties. 1" Note that the employment
nondiscrimination provisions of the Child Care and Development Block
Grant Act are more restrictive than Title VII, for the child-care legisla-
tion prohibits certain forms of employment discrimination even when
done on the basis of religion.145
Should a religiously affiliated organization choose to accept federal
financial assistance, three federal statutes prohibit discrimination in the
clientele that the social ministry is ultimately seeking to help. Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, color, or national origin.1"6 The Age Discrimination Act of
1975, as amended, prohibits discrimination on the basis of age.147 Fi-
nally, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, prohib-
its discrimination against otherwise qualified handicapped individuals.148
These three statutes were amended by the Civil Rights Restoration Act
141. See generally H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 964, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1991), reprinted in
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2374, 2626-29. Note that the federal Head Start Program, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2931-2932 (1991), which is presumptively available to child-care facilities operated by reli-
gious organizations, by its terms does not differentiate between religious and nonreligious
facilities.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1988).
143. d § 2000e-1. Nearly all states have human rights legislation that also prohibits dis-
crimination in employment on the same basis as Title VII. The state legislation generally
pertains to employers of approximately four or more employees. See infra note 161.
144. See Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
145. 136 CONG. REc. H12494, §§ 658N(a)(1)(B), (a)(3), 104 Stat. at 1388-245 (to be codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. 9858e). See also 56 Fed. Reg. 26,230-31 (1991) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R.
§§ 98.46, -.47).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). Section 604 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3, states that
this title does not pertain to employment discrimination. Employment discrimination is to be
remedied under Title VII.
147. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1988).
148. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1991). Title IX of the Educational Amendments of
1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1988), prohibits sex discrimination. However, Title IX pertains
only to educational institutions and thus is not of interest in this study of social service
organizations.
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of 1987.149 Sometimes called the Grove City College Bill (introduced
ostensibly to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City College
v. Bell 150), the Restoration Act broadened the scope of the nondiscrimi-
nation coverage of all three of these statutes with the following language:
For the purposes of this [statute], the term "program or activity"
and the term "program" mean all of the operations of -
(3)(A) an entire corporation, partnership, or other private or-
ganization, or an entire sole proprietorship -
(i) if assistance is extended to such corporation, partner-
ship, private organization, or sole proprietorship as a whole; or
(ii) which is principally engaged in the business of pro-
viding education, health care, housing, social services, or parks and
recreation
any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance.
Subsection 3(A) of the Restoration Act added coverage to each of these
three civil rights statutes over the "entire corporation, partnership, or
other private organization, or an entire sole proprietorship" if either
assistance is given to the entity (including, of course, a social service
agency) "as a whole" or the entity is "principally engaged in the business
of providing.., health care, housing, [or] social services" if "any part of
[the entity] is extended Federal financial assistance."
Accordingly, there are two ways in which the nondiscrimination re-
quirements could cover a religious social service ministry. First, if the
federal grant or other assistance is for a limited purpose, as distinct from
a benefit to aid the organization as a whole, the legislation would not
cover the entire religious organization. The committee report in the Sen-
ate suggests, by way of example, that financial assistance to Chrysler
Corporation for the purpose of preventing it from going bankrupt would
be assistance to the corporation "as a whole," whereas a grant to a reli-
gious organization to enable it to assist refugees would not be assistance
to the organization as a whole "if that is only one among a number of
149. Pub. L. No. 557, 100th Cong., 2d sess. (1988) (codified at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1687-1688
and amending 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1991)).
150. 465 U.S. 555 (1984). Section 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (West 1990), prohibits sex discrimination in "any education pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Grove City College was a private
liberal arts college whose students were receiving Basic Educational Opportunity Grants ad-
ministered by the U.S. Department of Education. The Court found that the student grants
were "Federal financial assistance," id. at 563-70, but that the nondiscrimination requirement
only extended to the college's financial aid office, id. at 570-74. This latter holding was viewed
by the civil rights community as too narrow an interpretation of "program or activity." As a
consequence there was pressure in Congress to amend the statute so that inter alia the nondis-
crimination requirement would pertain campus-wide in situations such as Grove City College.
activities of that organization."
' 15 1
The more likely means whereby a religious social ministry would be
covered by these three civil rights statutes is under the "principally en-
gaged" language of Subsection 3(A). When a religious social ministry
targets a single, or primarily a single, social problem or cause - for ex-
ample, a child-care facility or children's residential care home - then
the ministry will be covered by the language of Subsection 3(A)(ii).
Conversely, if the federal assistance goes to only one department or min-
istry within a larger organization, then apparently only the particular
program receiving the federal benefit is covered. For example, assume a
large church operates a child-care facility as one of its numerous minis-
tries, and the child-care facility comprises only a tenth of the church
budget and a fifth of all ministerial time and activity. Presumably the
entire church is not covered by the nondiscrimination requirements of
these three statutes, albeit the day-care center would be subject to the
civil rights acts. Under these three civil rights statutes, "Federal finan-
cial assistance" includes grants, loans, and in-kind transfers of goods or
services, but does not include tax credits or tax exemptions.1 52
B. State Legislation and Local Governmental Ordinances
State legislation, as well as municipal and county ordinances, in nu-
merous ways come to bear on social services operated by religious orga-
nizations. This subpart will examine the law in three of these areas:
comprehensive licensing schemes; child abuse reporting laws and their
interaction with the clergy-counselee privilege; and religious preferences
in adoption and foster placement agencies. These three subject areas are
merely exemplary. However, social service ministries are regulated in
numerous other ways: professional and occupational licenses;153 work-
151. S. REP. No. 64, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
19.
152. See, eg., Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 628 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1986);
Martin v. Delaware Law Sch. of Widener Univ., 625 F. Supp. 1288 (D. Del. 1985); Bachman
v. American Soc'y of Clinical Pathologists, 577 F. Supp. 1257, 1263-64 (D.N.J. 1983).
153. See Northrup v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. Rptr. 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (religious
beliefs exempted two women from midwifery licensing requirements); In re Bartha, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 39 (Cal. CL App. 1976) (conviction under city ordinance prohibiting fortune telling is
sustained because tenets of woman's religion did not require that she practice fortune telling
for a fee); Duffy v. California State Personnel Bd., 283 Cal. Rptr. 622 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
(priest removed from prison chaplaincy by state board when he failed to obtain approval by
Catholic bishop in diocese); Stetina v. State ex reL Medical Licensing Bd., 477 N.E.2d 322
(Ind. Ct. App. 1985), appeal following remand, 513 N.E.2d 1234 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (health
and nutrition practitioner prohibited from unlicensed practice because there was no showing
that treatments were part of tenets of church); Gregory S. Sarno, Annotation, Regulation of
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ers' compensation statutes; 154 labor relations; 5' state OSHA and other
safety laws; 56 incorporation and registration of foreign business stat-
utes;15 7 taxes (use,158 sales,159 property, 16° income and business licenses);
154. See South Ridge Baptist Church v. Industrial Comm'n, 676 F. Supp. 799 (S.D. Ohio
1987), aff'd, 911 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 754 (1991) (Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses not violated when church required, against its beliefs, to pay into
workers' compensation program); Victory Baptist Temple v. Industrial Comm'n, 442 N.E.2d
819 (Ohio Ct. App.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982) (same). Only three states (Arkansas,
Mississippi, and North Dakota) expressly exempt religious employers from workers' compen-
sation. 1C LAnSON'S WoR KMnN's COMPENSATION LAW § 50.42, at 9-132, 9-135 (1986).
Where statutory language neither includes nor excludes charitable organizations, a major-
ity of courts have held that charitable organizations are not exempt from workers' compensa-
tion. Greenway Baptist Church v. Industrial Comm'n, 636 P.2d 1264 (Ariz. CL App. 1981)
(church acting as its own general contractor); Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Indus. Accident
Comm'n, 230 P. 1 (Cal. 1924) (workman shingling roof of parish church); Levecque v. Dupuis,
175 A. 782 (Conn. 1934) (same); Gardner v. Trustees of Main Street Episcopal Church, 250
N.W. 740 (Iowa 1933) (church employee killed while excavating church building); Meyers v.
Southwest Region Conf. Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 79 So. 2d 595 (La. Ct. App. 1955),
rev'd, 88 So. 2d 381 (La. 1956) (neither state nor federal Constitution prohibited coverage of
minister who was injured traveling to church conference); Schneider v. Salvation Army, 14
N.W.2d 467 (1944) (laborer employed by "Men's Service Department"). Cf Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 34 P.2d 826 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934) (Volunteers
of America not within the act, even though injured person receiving charitable aid performed
some services); Hanson v. St. James Hotel, 254 N.W. 4 (Minn. 1934) (though claimant re-
ceived some charity aid and performed some services, no employment relation with mission
home). A minority of courts have excluded charitable organizations. Wright v. Fowler, 459
N.E.2d 386 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (non-religious charitable corporation not covered by act as it
existed prior to 1983 amendment); Zoulalian v. New England Sanatorium & Benevolent Ass'n,
119 N.E. 686 (Mass. 1918) (sanatorium); Caughman v. Columbia Y.M.C.A., 47 S.E.2d 788
(S.C. 1948); Spokane Methodist Homes, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 483 P.2d 168
(Wash. Ct. App. 1971), aff'd, 501 P.2d 589 (Wash. 1972) (no coverage prior to 1971 amend-
ment to act).
155. See Hill-Murray Fed'n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 471 N.W.2d 372
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (state's labor relations law violates both state and federal Constitutions
when applied to compel collective bargaining between lay teachers and church-related school).
156. Most state occupational safety and health laws are patterned after the federal Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq. (1988). OSHA applies to nonprofit
corporations, id. § 652, and to all employers "affecting commerce," id. § 652(5). The state
OSHA laws apply whether or not a religious organization affects interstate commerce.
157. See Gipson v. Brown, 706 S.W.2d 369 (Ark. 1986), appeal following remand, 295 Ark.
371, 749 S.W.2d 297 (1988), on writ of prohibition, Gipson v. Munson, 752 S.W.2d 752 (Ark.
1988); Tonia P. Jackson, Note, Constitutional Law - Religious Freedom - Forced Disclosure
of Church Records Pursuant to State Non-Profit Corporation Statute Prohibited, 12 U. ARK.
LIrLE ROCK L.J. 75 (1989) (reviewing Gipson decisions).
158. Imposition of state use-taxes on a religious ministry was sustained in Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990), and Institute in Basic Youth Con-
flicts, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 213 Cal. Rptr. 98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). An exemption
for religious organizations from a tax on the use or sale of services was approved in In re
Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987).
159. In Koliasch v. Adamany, 299 N.W.2d 891 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 313 N.W.2d 47 (Wis. 1981), fees collected for meals served to business organizations
at a retreat center operated by a monastic community of Roman Catholic sisters were held
state human rights acts and city ordinances concerning discrimination in
employment and public accommodations; 161 financial solicitation ordi-
subject to a state sales tax. Although finding that the serving of meals to their guests was a
religious activity, the court of appeals said that the sales tax was neither a tax on religion nor a
burden to the sisters' exercise of religion.
160. In the following cases the courts determined that the real estate held by a religious
social ministry was tax exempt: Maurer v. Young Life, 779 P.2d 1317 (Colo. 1989) (en banc)
(camping properties); Camp Isabella Freedman, Inc. v. Town of Canaan, 162 A.2d 700 (Conn.
1960) (camp for economically underprivileged); Fairview Haven v. Department of Revenue,
506 N.E.2d 341 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (intermediate-care wing of nursing home); Evangelical
Hosp. Ass'n v. Novak, 465 N.E.2d 986 (MI. App. Ct. 1984) (administrative and support serv-
ices for medical facility); Pentecostal Church of God v. Hughlett, 737 S.W.2d 728 (Mo. 1987)
(en banc) (housing for aged and handicapped); Salvation Army v. Hoehn, 188 S.W.2d 826
(Mo. 1945) (en banc) (home for girls and women with low income); St. John's Lutheran
Church v. City of Bloomer, 347 N.W.2d 619 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (retirement center); Kahal
Bnei Emunim v. Town of Fallsberg, 577 N.E.2d 34 (N.Y. 1991) (summer camp and educa-
tional institution).
In the following cases the courts determined that the real estate held by a religious social
ministry was not tax exempt: Salvation Army v. Department of Revenue, 524 N.E.2d 628,
appeal denied, 530 N.E.2d 264 (Il. 1988) (thrift store); Fairview Haven v. Department of
Revenue, 506 N.E.2d 341 (I1. App. Ct. 1987) (independent-living wing of nursing home);
Salvation Army v. Board of County Comm'rs, 777 P.2d 1280 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (commu-
nity center); Supervisor of Assessments v. Asbury Methodist Home, Inc., 547 A.2d 190 (Md.
Ct. App. 1986) (senior citizen apartment complex in continuing care community); Evangelical
Retirement Homes, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 669 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. 1984) (en bane) (retire-
ment homes); Church Contribution Trust v. Mendham Borough, 541 A.2d 249 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1988) (provider of psychological training and child development); In re Appeal
of Moravian Home, 382 S.E.2d 772 (N.C. Ct. App.), review denied and appeal dismissed, 388
S.E.2d 457 (N.C. 1989) (home for sick and aged); In re Barham, 319 S.E.2d 657(N.C. Ct.
App.), review denied, 323 S.E.2d 921 (N.C. 1984) (residential retirement center); G.D.L. Plaza
Corp. v. Council Rock Sch. Dist., 526 A.2d 1173 (Pa. 1987) (residential facility for elderly and
handicapped); Christian Home for the Aged v. Tennessee Assessment Appeals Comm'n, 790
S.W.2d 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (retirement home); Earle v. Program Centers of Grace
Union Presbytery, 670 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (youth camp).
See generally John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property: Historical Anomaly or
Valid Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 363 (1991).
161. See, eg., Dayton Christian Sch., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932 (6th
Cir. 1985) (oversight of parochial school by civil rights commission violates Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses), rev'd on other grounds, 477 U.S. 619 (1986); Dignity Twin Cities v.
Newman Center & Chapel, 472 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (campus ministry center
need not rent space to homosexual group; state constitution grants free exercise exemption
from local ordinance prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations on basis of "affec-
tional preference"); Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (female cleric's
sexual harassment claim against former church and her superior is actionable as sex discrimi-
nation; but First Amendment precludes claim for wrongful discharge as impermissibly probing
matters of church doctrine and religious motive); St. Louis Christian Home v. Missouri
Comm'n on Human Rights, 634 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (state commission on human
rights is without jurisdiction over religious children's home); Speer v. Presbyterian Children's
Home & Serv. Agency, 55 EmpI. Prac. Dec. 40,512 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1990) (children's home
does not waive religious exemption in state law by hiring members of different religious de-
nominations); Chase v. Redwood Gospel Mission, No. MCV-97947, 10 Religious Freedom
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nances; 162  lobbying and political activity regulation,'
63  zoning,164
Rptr. 298 (Mun. Ct. Sonoma Cty., Calif. 1990) (church-operated home for battered women
and children exempt from state minimum wage law).
162. The Supreme Court has been active in this subject area. See, e.g., Board of Airport
Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987) (rule declaring airport terminal not open
to First Amendment activity is unconstitutional on its face); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228
(1982) (state solicitation law discriminatory on basis of religious groups); Heffron v. Interna-
tional Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (non-discriminatory restrictions
on expression and solicitation at state fair grounds not violative of Free Speech Clause or the
Free Exercise Clause).
In another action, the invalidation of a city's charitable solicitation ordinance was sum-
marily affirmed by the Supreme Court in Rusk v. Espinosa, 456 U.S. 951 (1982), af'g, 634
F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1980). The ordinance prohibited charitable solicitation without a permit.
An exemption, however, was provided for certain religious solicitations. The collection of
money for religious purposes was defined as solicitation for "evangelical, missionary, or reli-
gious but not secular" ends. A secular purpose was defined as "not spiritual or ecclesiastical,
but rather relating to affairs of the present world, such as providing food, clothing, and coun-
seling." Espinosa v. Rusk, 634 F.2d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1980). Therefore, a program by the
Seventh-Day Adventist Church to solicit funds for the poor required a city permit. Acquiring
a permit entailed payment of a fee and completion of an application that required certain
information and documents including a current financial statement. Id. at 479 n.3. The
Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals which condemned the ordinance
for multiple offenses: (1) it sought to define whether a church program was religious or secu-
lar, id. at 480-81; (2) a city official was involved in the "continuing necessity for making
judgments as to what is or is not religious," using a standard "not susceptible of objective
measurement," id. at 481-82 (citation omitted); and (3) compliance would require the church
to disgorge extensive information about its purposes and finances, id. at 479 n.3.
For a case in the lower courts, see Church of Scientology Flag Services Org., Inc. v. City
of Clearwater, 756 F. Supp. 1498 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (upholding solicitation ordinance).
163. In a decision that troubled numerous religious organizations, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee held that the First Amendment did not shield churches participating in an effort to
defeat a liquor referendum from registration under a campaign disclosure act. Bemis Pente-
costal Church v. Tennessee, 731 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. 1987), appeal dismissed, 485 U.S. 930
(1988). See generally Glendon Shubert, Religious Interest-Group Politics in the Constitutional
Market Place: From Jeannett to Jonestown, 2 J.L. & POL. 201 (1985).
164. See, e.g., First Assembly of God of Naples, Fla. v. Collier County, 775 F. Supp. 383
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (ordinance preventing operation of homeless shelter on church grounds did
not violate First Amendment); Church of the Saviour v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 568 A.2d 1336
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (counseling center is appropriate use of church); Congregation Beth
Yitzchok, Inc. v. Town of Ramapo, 593 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (nursery school subject
to zoning); Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World Christianity v. Town of New Castle, 480
F. Supp. 1212 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (order to issue special use permit denied to youth camp); En-
cuentros Familares, Inc. v. Musgrove, 511 So. 2d 645 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (application
for retreat center reinstated); Lubavitch Chabad House v. City of Evanston, 445 N.E.2d 343
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982); cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983) (Free Exercise Clause violated when
special use permit denied to synagogue in single-family residential area where uses of building
include boarding, administrative offices, and counselling services); Church of God State Camp
v. Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs, 761 P.2d 1280 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987) (permitting
church camp); Wilkinson v. LaFranz, 574 So. 2d 403 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (soup kitchen per-
mitted); Needham Pastoral Counseling Ctr. v. Board of Appeals, 557 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. App.
Ct.), review denied, 560 N.E.2d 121 (Mass. 1990) (church counseling center); City of Rich-
mond Heights v. Richmond Heights Presbyterian Church, 764 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. 1989) (en
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landmarking, 165 and other land use controls; health, sanitation, food han-
dling, and environmental regulation; and building and fire codes. 66
1. Comprehensive Licensing Schemes
The most common form of regulation of social services is licensing.
Holding a license permits government inspection for the purpose of in-
suring compliance with rules promulgated by an administrative agency
designated to oversee the private-sector activity. Enforcement sanctions
typically entail suspension and revocation of the license to operate, along
with a criminal misdemeanor charge that can be brought against those
operating without the requisite license. Finally, there are usually reme-
dial measures in the event of threats of immediate bodily harm to chil-
dren or vulnerable adults whereby state authorities can quickly move
those in danger to a place of safety. 67 Although there has been some
banc) (day care center is "accessory use" of church, thus not violative of zoning ordinance);
Christian Retreat Ctr. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 560 P.2d 1100 (Or. Ct. App. 1977) (spe-
cial use permit denied retreat center); City of Rapid City v. Kahler, 334 N.W.2d 510 (S.D.
1983) (rescue mission and shelter for homeless not exempt from zoning).
165. See First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash. 1990) (en banc)
(landmarking of exterior of church violates Free Exercise), vacated and remanded, 111 S. Ct.
1097 (1991) (to be reconsidered in light of Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990));
Rector of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S Ct. 1103 (1991) (landmarking of building that church would like to tear down to
make room for commercial development not unconstitutional); Society of Jesus v. Boston
Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1990) (state constitution violated by landmark-
ing of interior of church); Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew v. Barwick, 496 N.E.2d 183,
(N.Y. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986) (landmarking of church property not ripe for
review); Lutheran Church in Am. v. City of New York, 316 N.E.2d 305, (N.Y. 1974)
(landmarking of church unconstitutional); Angela C. Carmella, Houses of Worship and Reli-
gious Liberty: Constitutional Limits to Landmark Preservation and Architectural Review, 36
VILL. L. REv. 401 (1991).
166. Courts have upheld more stringent building and fire codes for churches using their
facilities for schools during weekdays, in contrast to churches using facilities solely for inher-
ently religious purposes. See, e.g., Congregation Beth Yitzchok v. Town of Ramapo, 593 F.
Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (nursery school to teach Jewish laws and customs); Faith Assembly
of God, Inc. v. State Bldg. Code Comm'n, 416 N.E.2d 228 (Mass. Ct. App. 1981); Hough v.
North Star Baptist Church, 312 N.W.2d 158 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); State Fire Marshall v.
Lee, 300 N.W.2d 748 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
For cases sustaining fire code and other standards for gospel rescue missions, see Salva-
tion Army v. Department of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1990); Market St.
Mission v. Bureau of Rooming and Boarding House Standards, 541 A.2d 668 (N.J.), appeal
dismissed, 488 U.S. 882 (1988).
167. See, eg., State v. New Bethany Baptist Church, 535 So. 2d 1214 (La. Ct. App. 1988)
(upholding an ex parte order permitting state access to a church-run children's home, but
reversing authorization for mental and physical examinations of the children and employees,
and the removal of the children); In the Interest of M.I., 519 So. 2d 433 (Miss. 1988) (uphold-
ing temporary state takeover of religiously affiliated girls' home and sustaining contempt
charges against its operator).
Winter 19921 RELIGIOUSLY-BASED SOCIAL SERVICES
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
litigation by religious social services resisting comprehensive licensing
schemes as too intrusive into the religious beliefs and practices of board-
ing houses or rescue missions,"' nursing homes for the aged,169 homes
for the mentally retarded, 7 0 and denominational hospitals,17' by far the
greater number of cases have concerned the children's ministries of day-
care centers and residential care homes.
As with other areas of church-state relations, state administrative
agencies charged with oversight of residential children's homes and day-
care centers must strike a delicate balance between safeguarding children
and not interfering with the liberty of religious social ministries. These
state regulators can and must be unobtrusive when it comes to the
programmatic affairs of sectarian agencies and still satisfy their proper
function of insuring health, safety, and fire code compliance and sanita-
tion safeguards. The basic tenet from these cases is that administrative
agencies must not interfere with either the content or methods of the
religious program. However, there is a compelling governmental interest
in licensure as a means to protect the health and safety of children whose
168. See, eg., Salvation Army v. Department of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183 (3d Cir.
1990) (state Rooming and Boarding House Act not violative of Free Exercise or Establishment
Clause as to rescue mission); Market St. Mission v. Bureau of Rooming and Boarding House
Standards, 524 A.2d 1283 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987), rev'd, 541 A.2d 668 (N.J.), appeal
dismissed, 488 U.S. 882 (1988) (same).
169. See, eg., Cabinet for Human Resources v. Provincial Convent of the Good Shepherd,
Inc., 701 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (statutes and regulations governing operation of
nursing homes, when applied to religious convalescent home for aged, sick, and infirm nuns,
was violative of religious liberty).
170. See, e.g., Cullum v. Faith Mission Home, Inc., 379 S.E.2d 445 (Va. 1989) (Amish
home for mentally retarded exempt from licensure because care provided in accord with tenets
of church in ministration to sick and suffering by mental and spiritual means without use of
drug or material therapy); Wood v. Percy, No. 81-C-1282, 2 Religious Freedom Rptr. 102
(E.D. Wis. 1982) (state Department of Health and Social Services ordered not to interfere with
religious practices of home for retarded persons, so long as home complies with regulations to
protect health and safety of residents).
171. See, eg., St. Agnes Hosp. v. Riddick, 668 F. Supp. 478 (D. Md. 1987) (motion to
dismiss denied), 748 F. Supp. 319 (D. Md. 1990) (judgment in favor of accreditation associa-
tion), 751 F. Supp. 75 (D. Md. 1990) (hospital not entitled to stay pending appeal). The dis-
trict court held that: (1) the Free Exercise Clause does not require a hospital accreditation
association to exempt a Catholic hospital from its requirement that all obstetrics-gynecology
residency programs provide clinical training in family planning procedures; and (2) the action
of the association in withdrawing accreditation was not motivated by religious animus and
thus was not unlawful. Id at 76-77. See also Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. An-
drews, 260 Cal. Rptr. 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (injunction affirmed against Religious School of
Natural Hygiene preventing the school from offering prayer, supervised fasting and natural
diets as medical practice); Tulsa Area Hosp. Council, Inc. v. Oral Roberts Univ., 626 P.2d 316
(Okla. 1981) (upholding grant of certificate of need for university to construct 294 bed
hospital).
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parents or guardians have placed them in the care of others.1 72
A federal district court in Tabernacle Baptist Church v. Conrad 73
and a state supreme court in State ex rel O'Sullivan v. Heart Ministries,
Inc. 174 reached opposite conclusions concerning comprehensive state reg-
ulatory schemes affecting residential children's homes. In Tabernacle
Baptist, a church that operated a children's home brought a suit for de-
claratory and injunctive relief against the agency administering the state
mandatory licensing law.'75 The Child Welfare Agencies Act authorized
broad departmental discretion to make and enforce regulations relating
to the licensing of child care agencies "as may be necessary to carry out
the purposes" of the act.'76 In furtherance of this delegated authority,
the department promulgated rules that: (1) required licensing of chil-
dren's homes; (2) set minimum standards for the homes, including that a
home's program be "well rounded" with "appropriate community activi-
ties" available; (3) required a home to submit a report that "clearly de-
fined and explained" its purpose and that it met a "demonstrated need";
and (4) allowed inspection by the department.'77 After finding that the
religious atmosphere and training in the home was an integral part of its
program,' the federal court nullified the act and implementing regula-
tions as applied to religious homes. In doing so, the judge pointed the
way to a more tightly drawn statutory scheme so as to pass scrutiny
under the Establishment Clause, a plan that would nevertheless satisfy
the state's interest in the health and safety of the children' 79 without
entangling itself with the home's religious beliefs, program, or prac-
tices.'8 0 Thus, the federal court in Tabernacle Baptist would permit a
172. While the text examines whether religious liberty is violated by undue government
regulation of religious ministries, the opposite side of the same coin is at issue in cases chal-
lenging state funding to such religious agencies. For cases on whether the state or federal
constitutions prohibit state funding of church-affiliated orphanages, see Schade v. Allegheny
County Institution Dist., 126 A.2d 911 (Pa. 1956) (funding violates state, but not federal,
constitution); Dunn v. Chicago Indus. Sch., 117 N.E. 735 (Ill. 1917) (funding does not violate
state constitution); Sargent v. Board of Educ., 69 N.E. 722 (N.Y. 1904) (same).
173. No. 79-149 (D.S.C. Oct. 27, 1980).
174. 607 P.2d 1102 (Kan.), appeal dismissed, Health Ministries, Inc. v. Kansas, 449 U.S.
802 (1980).
175. No. 79-149, slip. op. at 5 (D.S.C. Oct. 27, 1980).
176. S.C. CODE § 43-15-30 (1976).
177. No. 79-149, slip op. at 3, 6 (D.S.C. Oct. 27, 1980).
178. Id. at 6. The Tabernacle Baptist Church was found to be an unincorporated religious
association, which as part of its ministry operated a home for neglected and disadvantaged
children. An integral part of the home's program was that the children received fundamental-
ist Christian training and discipline. Id
179. Id at 4. The home did not object to compliance with the local fire and health regula-
tions or to periodic inspection of the facility by the state regulatory department. Id.
180. Id at 5-6. In Tabernacle Baptist, the court stated:
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well-defined licensing scheme consonant with the state's legitimate inter-
est that the children be properly cared for, but not permit those regula-
tory entanglements that had the potential to submerge the religious
character pervading the home's rehabilitation program.1'"
In Heart Ministries, the state regulations concerning residential chil-
dren's homes mixed the legitimate health, safety and sanitation concerns
of government with the more troublesome area of program and person-
nel. For example, the regulations required that the governing board rep-
resent a variety of community interests, that the staff be provided state-
specified training, and that finances be "sound and adequate."' 1 2 The
Kansas Supreme Court upheld the comprehensive regulatory scheme as
within the state's police power. Unfortunately, the home did not argue
the Establishment Clause defenses 83 available to a children's home with
a profile that was apparently "pervasively sectarian."'8 4
Two other cases involving residential children's homes gave very
cursory consideration to First Amendment objections to state licensure
and resolved the issues against the religious ministries. Darrell Dorminey
Children's Home v. Georgia Department of Human Resources185 con-
cerned a challenge by a church and its pastor, as operators of an unli-
censed children's home, resisting licensing as a "child caring institution"
Although of the opinion that the application of a licensing provision setting forth
certain well-defined health and safety standards and containing a proviso prohibiting
the licensing authority from interfering with the Home's religious beliefs or practices
would be within the State's power ... the licensing scheme under consideration is not
so limited ....
[The regulations are] replete with broadly phrased provisions giving [the state
department] virtually unlimited discretion in assessing compliance with its mandates.
For example, if the [departmental] representative assigned to visit the Home was to
determine that its program of care was not sufficiently "well rounded," or that "ap-
propriate community activities" had not been made available, a license could be de-
nied, despite the fact that what the [departmental] representative considered a well
rounded program of care of appropriate community activities would fly in the face of
the [church's] religious beliefs.
Id (footnotes omitted).
181. Id at 2. The church was not able to point to any actual constraints on the religious
activities of the home at the time of suit because the home had never been licensed and had
only recently been pressured by the state into compliance. Id. Nevertheless, the court appears
to have been correct in issuing the injunction on the basis that there was a "substantial risk" of
entanglements in the absence of an injunction. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
182. 607 P.2d 1102, 1106 (Kan. 1980). Quite properly, any ministry would want its board
of directors to be of one mind on its religious purposes, thus rendering difficult, if not impossi-
ble, fulfillment of a duty to represent a variety of the community's interests.
183. Id. at 1107-08.
184. Id. at 1104-07. There were religious restrictions on staff selection, enforced obedience
to religious dogma, required attendance at worship services, and required religious or doctrinal
study. Further, the children's home was an integral part of the religious mission of the spon-
sors, and religious evangelization was a primary purpose of the home. Id.
185. 389 S.E.2d 211 (Ga. 1990).
under state statutes. The state supreme court did not discuss any specific
religious beliefs or practices constrained by the licensure statute and
summarily affirmed the decision by the trial court that neither the Free
Exercise nor Establishment Clauses were violated.
Much the same abbreviated treatment was given by the state court
of appeals in State ex reL Roberts v. McDonald.18 6 The state Department
of Human Services had brought an action to enjoin the continued opera-
tion of a boy's ranch affiliated with a church. The trial court had entered
summary judgment against the church, finding that neither the Free Ex-
ercise nor Establishment Clauses were violated. Again, the court did not
discuss the specific religious beliefs or practices that were allegedly bur-
dened by the licensing scheme. This lack of discussion, perhaps due to
the summary nature of the proceedings below, is regrettable. As in Tab-
ernacle Baptist, at least some of the regulations quoted by the Roberts
court have serious vagueness problems. The regulatory agency did not
have to issue a license until it "is satisfied that such facility will meet
known needs for the services proposed" and that minimum standards are
met.1I 7 Concerning the minimum standards, they include "requirements
for a constructive program," employees are to be of "good moral charac-
ter," facilities are to provide "full ... religious opportunities," and the
church facility is to have "good community relationships." ' Depend-
ing on how this statutory authority is made more concrete in the regula-
tions, the application to religious children's homes could well be void-
for-vagueness and thus chilling of religious exercise.
A series of three cases in Texas evidence a long-running battle be-
tween the Department of Public Welfare and three children's homes. In
Roloff Evangelistic Enterprises, Inc. v. State,189 the department brought
suit seeking to require compliance with the Child Care Licensing Act as
to three homes operated by a religious organization. On motion for sum-
mary judgment, the trial court granted the relief requested by the depart-
ment ordering the homes to secure licenses and to permit inspection by
state employees. The trial court had requested evidence of the manner in
which the legislation actually conflicted with religious beliefs or prac-
tices. Testimony by the pastors operating the homes was two-fold: for
the ministry to accept a license from the state implied civil superiority or
authority over a Christian ministry, and compliance with state standards
implied that the state had a role in the upbringing of children, which was
186. 787 P.2d 466 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 60 (1990).
187. 787 P.2d at 468 (quoting regulatory language).
188. Id
189. 556 S.W.2d 856 (rex. Civ. App. 1977), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 803 (1978).
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inimical to the belief that the primary responsibility rests with parents
who had placed the children in the home. Unable to see how these as-
serted conflicts (assuming they exist) actually impaired religious activi-
ties, the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed. In doing so, the court noted
that the Licensing Act was addressed solely to the physical and mental
well-being of the children. Indeed, the authorizing legislation specifically
instructed the state agency not to encroach into areas of religious belief
or training.
190
As with Roloff, the case of Oxford v. Hill191 did not present a frontal
conflict between the Texas Child Care Licensing Act and religious prac-
tices. In Oxford, the plaintiff was an employee and director of one of the
children's homes operated by Roloff Evangelistic Enterprises. The court
below dismissed the action without trial, having found the act constitu-
tional. Because of the lack of a factual record, on appeal no coercive
effect on the employee's religious convictions could be cited. The court
of appeals affirmed.
In State v. Corpus Christie People's Baptist Church, Inc., 92 one
learns that the children's homes at issue in Roloff and Oxford have been
transferred to the ownership and control of a church. Nonetheless, the
resistance to state licensure fairs no better in People's Baptist. The state
supreme court, holding that there is a compelling governmental interest
in the safeguarding of children, said that the Free Exercise Clause is not
violated. Again, the court did not discuss any specific restrictions on
religious beliefs or practices. Moreover, the supreme court noted that the
licensure statute and regulations promulgated thereunder affected only
matters concerning the children's health, safety, and well-being. The
regulations specifically prohibited the state agency from regulating or at-
tempting to control "the content or method of any instruction of curricu-
lum of a school sponsored by a religious organization."' 193 Finally, the
court read the Establishment Clause - mistakenly it seems - as not
applicable, stating that the clause protected religious autonomy only in
instances of regulations accompanying government aid to a religious
organization.
194
In another early decision reached without a trial involving a church-
operated day-care center, a state appellate court in North Carolina v. Fay-
190. 556 S.W.2d at 859.
191. 558 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
192. 683 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1984), cert denied, 474 U.S. 801 (1985).
193. 683 S.W.2d at 696 (quoting statutory language).
194. Id. at 695.
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etteville Street Christian School 19' upheld state authority to regulate such
facilities for the protection of the children's health, safety, and moral
environment. 196 The opinion is at best of persuasive value, however,
since the Supreme Court of North Carolina vacated the opinion and re-
manded to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that the inter-
locutory appeal was improvidently granted. 197
In Fayetteville, the Child Day-Care Licensing Commission and
other state officials sued several church day-care centers and their direc-
tors because they refused either to obtain licenses or to renew licenses
that had expired. Although refusing to be licensed, the day-care minis-
tries of the churches had agreed to provide the state with evidence of
their compliance with fire, health and safety regulations.198 Soon after
the suit was initiated, the parties filed cross motions. The state sought a
preliminary injunction to stop operation of the child-care centers until
they obtained a license. The child-care centers moved to dismiss, arguing
that the licensing statutes violated the free exercise rights of church-
owned day-care facilities. 199 No evidentiary hearing was held. The
churches filed affidavits stating that the operation of their centers was a
ministry of their churches, that the religious and secular activities of the
day-care centers were indivisible components, and that state licensing vi-
olated their religious liberty. In equally bold and conclusory assertions,
the state's affidavits said that the Day-Care Facilities Act's requirements
applied only to health and safety, and thus did not interfere with any
religious practice or religions education."X The trial court denied the
churches' motion to dismiss and granted the state's request for prelimi-
nary injunction.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed. The statute grants
to the Child Day-Care Licensing Commission the authority to license all
day-care facilities meeting health and safety standards, conduct inspec-
tions and review inspection reports by other agencies, provide educa-
tional and consultation services, and promulgate regulations.201 The
health and safety standards are not determined by the commission, but
195. 258 S.E.2d 459 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 261
S.E.2d 908 (N.C.), vacated and remanded following rehearing, 265 S.E.2d 387 (N.C.), appeal
dismissed, 449 U.S. 807 (1980).
196. 258 S.E.2d at 463-64.
197. 261 S.E.2d 908, 914; 265 S.E.2d 387, 389 (N.C. 1980).
198. 258 S.E.2d at 461.
199. Id.
200. Id
201. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-88 (1978).
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either appear in other sections of the act,202 are developed by the Com-
mission for Health Services (medical and sanitation) and the State Insur-
ance Department (fire prevention), or are found in the North Carolina
Building Code.
Other than the general allegation that their religious liberty was
abridged by the act, the only assertion of the day-care centers was the
abstract contention that the state may not require a church to obtain a
license as a condition precedent to its performing an important part of its
ministry. The Fayetteville court rejected this assertion with these
findings:
(1) that the wording of the Act in question does not grant to the
State any authority to interfere with the religious belief or freedom
of defendants; (2) that the day care licensing requirements speak
only to minimum standards of health and safety and do not inter-
fere with any religious practices or contain any educational re-
quirements for staff or children; (3) that all of the defendants have
heretofore been licensed by the Commission without any objec-
tions; and (4) that defendants do not contend or show that it is
contrary to their sincere religious belief to seek licenses.20 3
As indicated above, the state supreme court later vacated for procedural
reasons.
In Michigan Department of Social Services v. Emmanuel Baptist Pre-
school,204 perhaps the leading case concerning licensure of church-based
day-care facilities, the Supreme Court of Michigan upheld certain regula-
tory requirements while striking down others. Notwithstanding the day-
care center's abstract claim that to obtain a license implied that its minis-
try was subordinate to the state, the majority of the supreme court sus-
tained a general licensure requirement. As to specific regulations, the
court unanimously upheld a regulation prohibiting corporal punish-
ment.0 5 The court was divided, however, on other aspects of the case.
The majority struck down a regulation requiring that a day-care facility
director have minimal educational credentials from an accredited institu-
tion.20 6 This was because a church may desire to employ its director
with a degree from a religious institution of higher education that
chooses not to be state-accredited. Further, a majority of the court
202. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90.1 (qualifications of stafi), § 110-91(6) (space re-
quirements), § 110-91(7) (staff-child ratio), and § 110-91(9) (record keeping) (1978).
203. 258 S.E.2d 459, 463 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
204. 455 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1990). The state supreme court reversed the Michigan Court of
Appeals, 388 N.W.2d 326 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986), which had reversed a trial court decision
that had struck down certain regulations and affirmed others. 455 N.W.2d at 3.
205. Id. at 3.
206. Id at 3.
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struck down as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad a regulation re-
quiring that a day-care center program be one that steered the emotional
development of children in the direction of a "positive self-concept."2 "7
Finally, the church objected to the financial disclosure provisions in the
regulations. Because the state had never demanded the financial records
of Emmanuel Baptist Preschool, the majority found that issue was not
ripe for review.2"' From the majority opinion, and the four separate
opinions, it is evident that the balance of the regulations that directly
address the health and safety of children would be sustained.
In North Valley Baptist Church v. McMahon,2°9 a church-operated
preschool unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of the Califor-
nia Child Care Facilities Act. The act's licensing regulations imposed
requirements in the areas of physical structure, nutrition, immunizations,
child-staff ratios, record keeping, personnel, and financial disclosure.
Following a two-week trial on the merits, only three objectionable statu-
tory requirements remained unresolved: a regulation prohibiting corpo-
ral punishment, a requirement that every preschool submit fingerprints
of all employees in order that a criminal background records check could
be done, and a requirement that each child at a facility "be free to attend
religious services or activities of his/her choice and to have visits from a
spiritual advisor of his/her choice."21 0 The first two regulations were
understandably sustained as appropriate health and safety interests of the
state. The church-based preschool objected to the religious serv-
ices/advisor regulation because it would either prevent the offering of a
mandatory religious curriculum or would require the preschool to open
its door to religious advisors inimical to the beliefs of the church.211 The
state, however, did not interpret the regulation in this manner. It read
the reference to "religious choice" as an election to be made by the par-
ent, not the young child. Applied in this manner, the religious serv-
ices/advisor regulation did not conflict with the beliefs of the church.
Indeed, it was the policy of the church-based preschool to fully disclose
its religious orientation to parents inquiring about enrolling their
children.
212
Finally, in Kansas ex rel. Pringle v. Heritage Baptist Temple,2 13 a
207. Id at 2-3.
208. Id. at 3.
209. 696 F. Supp. 518 (E.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd, 893 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1990), cert denied,
110 S. Ct. 3215 (1990).
210. 696 F. Supp. at 530-33.
211. Id. at 533.
212. Id.
213. 693 P.2d 1163 (Kan. 1985).
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church that operated an unlicensed day-care center was enjoined from
continued operation without first obtaining a license. The church lacked
standing to challenge regulations of the Department of Health and Envi-
ronment prohibiting corporal punishment. There was an administrative
remedy under which the church could challenge the rule and perhaps
obtain a variance accommodating the church's religious beliefs. The
court rejected the church's objection to licensure - that taking a license
implies the state is head of the church - with the specious observance
that "the operation of a day-care center [is] not ... the exercise of a
religious activity." Notwithstanding that religious activities may be part
of the center's curriculum, said the court, those "activities are not dis-
turbed or burdened by licensure. 121 4 The final result reached by the
Supreme Court of Kansas is in line with cases elsewhere.215 But when
the opinion states that the church's day-care center is not a religious ac-
tivity and thus apparently not deserving of First Amendment protection,
the court errs both as to fact and law. The facts were not in serious
dispute and indicated that the day-care center was founded out of reli-
gious motivation and that religious teaching was integral to the program.
Moreover, serious legal implications follow from the logic that because
many day-care centers are secular, the operation of such a center by a
church is therefore not a religious activity. It is common for Christian
churches to view all that they do as originating in faith and in further-
ance of religious responsibilities.216 Merely because church-operated
214. Id at 1167.
215. The most recent decision concerning a church-based day-care facility is Health Servs.
Div. v. Temple Baptist Church, 814 P.2d 130 (N.M. App.), cert. denied, 814 P.2d 103 (N.M.
1991). Temple Baptist raised now-familiar issues: (1) the church objected in principle to licen-
sure of its child-care facility arguing that the requirement implied that the ministry was
subordinate to the state rather than to Christ; and (2) the prohibition on spanking was con-
trary to the church's disciplinary practices. The state court of appeals, applying the "generally
applicable, religion-neutral" standard for Free Exercise Clause analysis recently adopted in
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990), upheld the mandatory licens-
ing law and the regulation on corporal punishment. 814 P.2d at 134-35. Apparently no Estab-
lishment Clause defense was argued, and the appeals court refused to take up a state
constitutional defense because the issue had not been raised earlier in the trial court. Id at
136.
The only other reported decision concerning religious day-care facilities is found in Texas
v. Pampa Baptist Temple, 4 Religious Freedom Rptr. 148 (Tex. Dist. Ct., 1984) (permanent
injunction entered prohibiting Pampa Christian Academy from operating its child-care facility
without first obtaining a license from the Texas Department of Human Resources).
216. Many activities that obviously are exercises of religion are not required by conscience
or doctrine. Singing in the church choir and saying the Roman Catholic rosary are two com-
mon examples. Any activity engaged in by a church as a body is an exercise of religion. This
is not to say that all such activities are immune from regulation: there may be a sufficiently
strong governmental interest to justify the intrusion. But neither are those activities wholly
without constitutional protection. It is not dispositive that an activity is not compelled by the
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day-care centers have "secular counterparts" in the general society does
not make the activity nonreligious when done by a church. To conclude
otherwise is to permit the courts to define for churches what is "secular"
and what is "religious" among their activities. It is for the churches to
define for themselves which of their practices are "religious," leaving to
the civil courts to determine if those putative religious activities are pro-
tected from the objected-to government regulation.
Some states exempt religious day-care and residential care homes
from full licensure. These exemptions have been challenged as "advanc-
ing religion" and thus violating the Establishment Clause. In Corpora-
tion of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos,217 the Supreme Court made it clear that a legislative body could,
consistent with the Establishment Clause, exempt a religious organiza-
tion from regulatory burdens shared by secular organizations otherwise
similarly situated.21 The legitimating purpose of such an exemption
may be either to provide additional breathing room for the place of reli-
gious practice or to reduce entanglements between religious institutions
and government. Until Amos made the matter clear, litigation in several
states challenged religious accommodations and exemptions under state
licensure statutes concerning residential children's homes and day-care
centers. Some states completely exempt church-affiliated child-care facil-
ities from licensure,2 19 whereas other states continue to regulate such fa-
cilities but with reduced governmental oversight.
2 0
The leading case, Forest Hills Early Learning Center, Inc. v. Grace
Baptist Church,221 was a challenge to a Virginia statute that regulated
official doctrine of a church or the religious conscience of an individual believer. Laycock,
supra note 28, at 1390-91.
217. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
218. In Amos, the Court sustained the constitutionality of§ 702 of the Civil Rights of 1964,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1988). See also supra notes 45-51.
219. ALA. CODE § 38-7-3 (1975) (effective Apr. 22, 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. § 2212.09 (ef-
fective Jan. 1, 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-15-9 (1972) (effective 1946); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 210.516(5) (1986).
220. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-78-209 (Michie 1987) (effective 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-
3-2-12.7 and -12.8 (West 1982 and Supp. 1991) (effective 1987 & 1988); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 46:1404 and 46:1405 (West 1982) (effective Sept. 1, 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131D-1 to
131D-10.4 (1990) (effective 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-2700, 20-7-2900 to 20-7-2970
(Law Co-op. 1976) (effective May 19, 1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-196.3 (Michie 1950 and
Supp. 1987) (effective 1979) (amend. will be effective June 1, 1992).
221. 846 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989). The earlier litigation
history is found in Forest Hills Early Learning Center v. Lukhard, 480 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. Va.
1979), and 487 F. Supp. 1378 (E.D. Va. 1980), vacated and remanded, 642 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.
1981), on remand, 540 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D. Va. 1982) (granting summary judgment), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 728 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1984), on remand, Civ. Action No. 80-0116-R
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child-care facilities at reduced intensity if operated by a "religious insti-
tution." As opposed to full licensure, a religiously operated facility must
give written notice to the state that it is in operation; comply with appli-
cable building, fire, and sanitation codes; allow inspection by officials to
assure compliance with these codes and submit proof of the results; pro-
vide written notice of the center's unlicensed status to those who are con-
sidering using its facilities; comply with minimum staff-child ratios; and
permit official investigation should a citizen file a complaint.22 Relying
on Amos, the circuit court sustained the constitutionality of the Virginia
exemption.223 Similar results have been reached in Illinois,224 Mis-
souri,225 and Florida.226 The few reported decisions to the contrary were
either decided before Amos 227 or decided on a theory other than an Es-
tablishment Clause violation.228 Based on litigation recently initiated,
1986), on remand, 661 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Va. 1987). The federal district court hd granted
summary judgment against the sectarian day-care centers on the basis that none of the full-
licensure regulations directly infringed a sincerely held religious belief. The court had earlier
held that the exemption for religious preschools, although not violating the Equal Protection
Clause, did violate the Establishment Clause as a provision having the effect of advancing
religion. In the course of the prolonged Forest Hills litigation, Amos was decided by the
Supreme Court. Following the Amos decision, the Fourth Circuit, 846 F.2d 260, sustained the
constitutionality of the Virginia legislation.
222. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-196.3 (Michie 1985).
223. Forest Hills, 846 F.2d at 261.
224. Pre-School Owners Ass'n v. Department of Children and Family Servs., 518 N.E.2d
1018 (Ill.), appeal dismissed, 487 U.S. 1212 (1988). The operators of secular day-care centers
had sued alleging that the statutory exemption for religious centers violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. The court sustained the constitutionality of the exemption finding
that the regulation did not violate the Establishment Clause.
225. Child Day-Care Ass'n v. O'Hara, 9 Religious Freedom Rptr. 81 (Mo. Cir. Ct., Div. 3,
1989). Secular child-care institutions had sued the state of Missouri because religious facilities
were entirely exempt from licensure. The trial court held that the exemption did not violate
either the Establishment or Free Exercise Clause, nor was the exemption from licensure a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
226. Forte v. Coler, 725 F. Supp. 488 (M.D. Fla. 1989), appeal dismissed, 886 F.2d 1324
(11th Cir. 1989). The federal district court sustained the constitutionality of a Florida statu-
tory exemption of child-care facilities where the centers were an integral part of a church or
parochial school.
227. See Arkansas Day Care Ass'n v. Clinton, 577 F. Supp. 388 (E.D. Ark. 1983). Recent
Arkansas legislation exempted church-operated child-care facilities from formal compliance
with licensing standards applicable to secular facilities. However, the statute still required
compliance with identical regulations concerning health, safety, and welfare of children in
such facilities. The district court went on to state that exempting church-operated facilities
from substantially the same regulatory burdens as secular facilities would over-accommodate
the church-based centers and thus be unconstitutional. Clearly, Amos is to the contrary.
228. See Cohen v. City of Des Plaines, 742 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Ill. 1990). A city ordinance
exempted from regulatory and permit requirements child-care providers that operated in
buildings used for religious purposes. The court held the ordinance unconstitutional as a viola-
tion of equal protection. Additionally, the ordinance was said to be violative of the Establish-
ment Clause because it had the primary effect to advance religion, and that the benefit to
the wrongheaded notion that exemptions from regulation enacted out of
a desire to expand religious liberty violate the Establishment Clause is
not an idea that easily dies.229
2. Privileged Clergy Communications and Abuse Reporting Laws
At common law there did not exist an evidentiary privilege for com-
munications between priest and penitent or clergy and counselee. 230 The
privilege in some form is currently recognized in every state by statute or
rule of court,231 and is recognized in federal courts as a natural adjunct
to religious liberty as protected by the First Amendment.232 Private
communications between social workers and their counselees are gener-
ally not recognized as privileged in the course of judicial proceedings.233
Thus, an interesting situation arises when the vocations of social work
and cleric come together in a social welfare agency operated under the
auspices of a church or other religious organization.
A Presbyterian minister successfully quashed a grand jury subpoena
in the case of In re Verplank.234 As one of its ministries, a church lo-
cated near a college operated a draft counseling center to assist its parish-
ioners and other young men in the community. The director of the draft
counseling center was an ordained minister in the church and also held
the position of chaplain at the college.2 35 A grand jury was investigating
wide-spread violations of the selective service laws. A subpoena seeking
religion was not mandated by the Free Exercise Clause. As to the alternative Establishment
Clause holding, clearly Amos is to the contrary.
229. See Porter v. Axelrod, 11 Religious Freedom Rptr. 56 (N.Y. App. Div., No. 3648-88,
filed Nov. 26, 1990). This complaint alleges that the state's recent promulgation of standards
for residential health-care facilities accommodating certain religious beliefs violates the Estab-
lishment Clause. The plaintiffs are two individuals with AIDS and three AIDS advocacy
groups. They brought this action against the Commission of the New York State Department
of Health and the Public Health Council of the State of New York. It is alleged that certain
administrative rules are "devised to effectuate religious concerns of one [Roman Catholic] pro-
vider of health services" by permitting said facility to not provide contraceptives and "safe-
sex" counseling. The regulation permits facilities to decline "to perform or implement any
service, activity, policy or procedure because of: a) its religious beliefs, or b) sincerely held
moral convictions central to the facility's operating principles if off-site provisions of such
services is arranged by the Department of Health."
230. JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2394 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
231. JoHN C. BuSH & WILLIAM H. TIEMANN, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE: PRIVILEGED
CLERGY COMMUNICATION AND THE LAW 223 (3d ed. 1989). See generally LYNN R. Buz-
ZARD & DAN HALL, CLERGY CONFIDENTIALITY: A TIME TO BE SILENT, AND A TIME TO
SPEAK (1988); Annotation, Privileged Communications--Clergymen, 49 A.L.R.2d 1205
(1973).
232. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1990).
233. In re Wood, 430 F. Supp. 41, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
234. 329 F. Supp. 433 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
235. Id at 434.
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records of the church-based draft counseling center was quashed, not
only as to counselees assisted by the minister but also as to those young
men who were assisted by non-ministerial staff of the center working
under the direction of clergy.2 36 To the same effect is Rivers v. Rivers,
2 37
holding that a marriage counseling service sponsored by a church as part
of its "outreach program" was activity under the auspices of the church.
Thus, conversations between a pastor and those seeking marital and spir-
itual advice were privileged. Significantly, the fact that the pastor was in
part acting as a therapist and in part as a cleric in his position at the
counseling service did not nullify the evidentiary privilege.2 38 The court
deemed the entire counseling engagement as merged into his capacity as
a clergyman, because of the impossibility of sorting out the dual roles
and because of potential entanglement should the law seek to divine
when the minister was acting solely as a cleric.239
As with all evidentiary privileges, it is fundamental that the clergy-
counselee privilege extends only to communications given in private so
that aid or advice can be rendered. Accordingly, in In re Wood 2 the
court refused to block a grand jury investigation seeking records in the
hands of a bishop of the Episcopal Church. The National Commission
on Hispanic Affairs was a ministry of the Episcopal Church designed to
address the social, economic, and spiritual needs of Hispanics in the
United States. The Federal Bureau of Investigation was looking into
whether certain members of the Hispanic Commission or the bishop
overseeing the ministry could help the FBI locate certain fugitives from
the law. Because the subpoenas did not seek confidential communica-
tions between clerics and present or former members of the Hispanic
Commission, but only sought to learn what they knew about the wherea-
bouts of certain suspects, the privilege was inapplicable.241
The virtual explosion in reported incidents of child abuse242 and
elder abuse,243 including the sexual molestation of children, has created
one of the newest issues of government involvement with church-based
social service ministries. Many states have responded to this crisis of
236. Id. at 436.
237. 354 S.E.2d 784 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987).
238. Id at 787-88.
239. The case is similar to State v. Hodges, infra notes 249-51 and accompanying text, in so
far as a cleric is performing duties in two capacities. The court in Hodges, reached the oppo-
site result.
240. 430 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
241. Id. at 46.
242. See BUSH & TIEMANN, supra note 231, at 249-56 (summarizing child abuse reporting
laws in the states).
243. Id at 257-64 (summarizing elder abuse reporting laws in the states).
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child and elder abuse by adopting statutes concerning the reporting of
suspected abuse. Some of the legislation makes reporting permissive, and
other states make reporting mandatory. Making the reporting of sus-
pected abuse permissive abrogates any claim by a counselee against a
cleric for breach of privileged communication. Laws making the report-
ing mandatory are often accompanied by criminal sanctions for failure to
report.
Two recent cases in which social workers at religious ministries were
convicted of criminal misdemeanors for failure to report suspected child
abuse, illustrate the seriousness of this unresolved issue. 2' In State v.
Motherwell,241 three counselors employed by a large metropolitan church
were convicted because of information they learned in counseling ses-
sions with parishioners. On appeal, two of the convictions were affirmed,
and a third was reversed. As to all three defendants, the court rejected
the challenge to the mandatory abuse-reporting law as violative of the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.246 The convictions were af-
firmed as to the two counselors who were not ordained ministers. As a
matter of statutory construction, the state supreme court held that the
reporting requirement did not apply to clergy, so long as the information
is learned when an individual is functioning in the professional capacity
as a member of the clergy.247 Accordingly, the third conviction, of the
defendant who was an ordained minister as well as a counselor, was
reversed.248
244. See William A. Cole, Religious Confidentiality and the Reporting of Child Abuse: A
Statutory and ConstitutionalAnalysis, 21 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1 (1987); Kathryn Kee-
gan, Comment, The Clergy-Penitent Privilege and the Child Abuse Reporting Statute: Is the
Secret Sacred?, 19 3. MARSHALL L. REV. 1031 (1986); Alexander D. Hill & Chi-Dooh Li, A
Current Church-State Battleground: Requiring Clergy to Report Child Abuse, 32 J. oF
CHURCH & ST. 795 (1990); Note, Constitutional Law--Freedom of Religion-Requiring Re-
ports of Religious Counseling Sessions Under Child Abuse Reporting Statutes Does Not Violate
the First Amendment [State v. Motherwell], 13 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 151 (1990) (disap-
proving Motherwell decision); Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting
Requirements versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. Rnv. 723
(1986).
245. 788 P.2d 1066 (Wash. 1990) (en banc).
246. Id at 1070-74. Concerning the Free Exercise Clause claim, the court noted that the
result "might be different if the counselors' religious tenets required them to keep confidential
all information learned in counseling sessions, because requiring a report in these circum-
stances could coerce a direct violation of religious tenets." Id at 1071 n.8.
247. Id at 1069.
248. See also Forest Hills Early Learning Ctr., Inc. v. Lukhard, 661 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Va.
1987), rev'd on other grounds, Forest Hills Early Learning Ctr., Inc. v. Grace Baptist Church,
846 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989) (district court held, inter alia,
Virginia's regulation requiring that child-care facilities report child abuse did not violate free
exercise rights of church-based day-care).
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In State v. Hodges,249 two ordained ministers were found guilty of
failing to report a stepfather's sexual abuse of a student enrolled in their
church-operated school. Notwithstanding that the defendants were
clergy and pastors in the church, the information they learned was in
their role as administrators of the church-based school. Accordingly, as
construed by the trial court there was no exemption from the reporting
requirement, and the court declined to grant an exemption because of
First Amendment religious liberty concerns. 250 The convicted pastors
have appealed.251
3. Religious Preferences in Adoption and Foster Home Placements
Several states have laws requiring that children up for adoption or in
foster homes be placed where practicable in a home of the same religion
as that of the child. Religiously affiliated adoption and foster home
placement agencies also seek to place children under their care into
homes that reflect their own religion. The religious liberty law in this
area has to accommodate three and sometimes four concerns: the reli-
gious agency desires to be faithful to its beliefs and practices; the parent
or guardian may desire placement in accordance with his or her religious
preference; and the children being placed may have religious preferences
of their own, or they may not want to have religion forced on them. In
instances where the government is subsidizing the care of the child in
placement, there is the additional concern that the state not unconstitu-
tionally advance religion. The few generally reported cases in this area
have been remarkably negligent of any regard for the institutional integ-
rity of the religiously affiliated social agency.
In a decision characterized as "shocking" and "unprecedented,
' 25 2
249. Nos. F 117153, M 569488 (Mun. Ct. San Diego, May 31, 1989) reported in Nat'l &
Int'l Religion Rptr., Vol. 5, Nos. 1 & 7 (Dec. 31, 1990 and Mar. 25, 1991). The two pastors
were arrested in 1988 after officials learned that they had failed to disclose that the child at the
school told them that her stepfather, a lay minister at the church, had molested her for several
years. One of the ministers confronted the stepfather, who confessed and was removed from
his church responsibilities and disciplined before the congregation.
250. No. M 569488, Order and Opinion (Mun. Ct. San Diego, May 31, 1989), aff'd, 9
Religious Freedom Rptr., 292 (App. Dep't, Mun. Ct. San Diego, Oct. 27, 1989), writ denied,
No. D011138 (Cal. Ct. App., 4th App. Dist. Nov. 27, 1989), writ denied, No. S013147 (Cal.
Jan. 18, 1990).
251. No. CR 121291, statement on appeal (App. Dep't, Mun. Ct. San Diego, filed July 24,
1991).
252. Marjorie Phillips, Babylift: Just Look At You Now, 32 ETERNITY 25 (1981). Dr. W.
Stanley Mooneyham's entire statement was:
I risked my life to save those babies from certain death, and I'm not going to remain
silent and simply let them be "kidnapped" by the State of California or anyone
else.... The decision is strange, shocking, unprecedented. If allowed to stand, no
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a California-based foster and adoptive home placement agency lost the
right to place children exclusively with families who were active mem-
bers of an evangelical Protestant church. Scott v. Family Ministries25 3
involved twenty orphans air-lifted from Cambodia on the eve of its fall to
the Khmer Rouge in April 1975 and brought to the state-licensed Family
Ministries in California for adoptive placement. When the children first
arrived in the United States, Dr. Richard Scott was one of the attending
physicians. Dr. Scott inquired with Family Ministries about adopting
one of the children, but was told that he and his wife were ineligible
because they were not members of an evangelical Protestant church. Dr.
and Mrs. Scott sued seeking to adopt one of the children and to enjoin
Family Ministries from enforcing its religious eligibility requirement in
selecting adoptive homes for any of the twenty children.
254
The trial court required that the state Department of Health be noti-
fied as a party in interest having jurisdiction over adoptive placement.
However, the department made it clear that it took no position in the
matter.25  Following trial on the merits, the lower court found for the
Scotts and granted the requested injunction against Family Ministries.
On appeal the judgment was affirmed. California law, like that of
many states, allows religious matching in adoptive placement. Religious
matching requires or prefers adoption by parents of the same religious
faith as that of a natural parent of the child or of a religion for which the
biological parent expresses a preference. 25 6 This policy arose out of the
common-law right of a biological parent to control the religious upbring-
ing of his or her child.257 The state remains neutral in this religious mat-
ter by simply honoring the desires of the parent.
religious agency will ever be able safely to bring orphaned children into California for
adoptive placement.
Mooneyham was President of World Vision, Int'l. World Vision is a nonprofit interdenomina-
tional Christian corporation conducting global-wide relief services to third world countries.
253. 135 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1976). World Vision sued in federal district court seeking declara-
tory and injunctive relief against all the parties to the state suit. World Vision Int'l v. Superior
Court, No. CV-75-3776 I H (C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 11, 1975). World Vision sought to protect
its interest in the children which it had brought to the United States and which had been
surrendered to Family Ministries only because World Vision did not hold a license in Califor-
nia to be an adoptive placement agency. The federal district court abstained from interfering
in the state's handling of the matter and dismissed the suit.
254. 135 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
255. Id. at 434-35.
256. As the court noted, about 95% of the population of Cambodia is Buddhist. However,
at the time when World Vision took custody of the children concerned, the parents, if avail-
able, were told that the baby might be placed for adoption in a Christian home and were asked
to sign a written "relinquishment." Id at 433.
257. Id at 437.
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The appellate court ventured farther than ever before in declaring
that the state licensing scheme over private adoptive agencies made the
actions of private agencies also " tate action in the context of the Estab-
lishment Clauses." 258 Thus, the court reasoned, if the state must be neu-
tral in matters of religion, so must private agencies such as Family
Ministries! The case is ill-considered because it confuses "state action"
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause259 with
action that constitutes impermissible state advancement of religion for
purposes of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.26" In-
deed, more recent pronouncements by the Supreme Court have held that
state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes does not follow simply
because a private-sector agency is licensed or pervasively regulated by a
state, nor is there state action merely because the operating and capital
costs of the private-sector agency is subsidized by a state.261
If Scott v. Family Ministries were regarded as good law today, the
implications would be far-reaching indeed. Family Ministries exists for
the very purpose of discriminating in favor of its particular religious per-
suasion, as do other adoptive agencies sponsored by other faiths. The
court of appeals makes no mention of having considered the Free Exer-
cise and Establishment Clause rights of Family Ministries, its employees,
and sponsoring churches.262
A position advocating operational autonomy for a religious agency
is considerably undercut when the agency is supported by government
funds. Consider the protracted litigation concerning a state foster-care
258. Id at 438.
259. State action exists for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment when the state and a
private party maintain a symbiotic relationship (Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715 (1961)); when the state requires, encourages or is otherwise significantly involved in
nominally private conduct (Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)); and when the
private person or entity exercises a traditional state function (Smith v. Allwright, 319 U.S. 738
(1943), and Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)).
260. Although one can hope that Scott v. Family Ministries is given a quiet burial, the
story for the twenty children has a happier ending. In consideration for not appealing the
decisions to a higher court, the Los Angeles County Department of Adoptions approved the
adoptions of the children by the families chosen by Family Ministries. Phillips, supra note
252.
261. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (state action not found where 90% of
private schoors operating budget provided by public funds); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991
(1982) (state action not present where nursing homes were extensively regulated); Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (no state action despite extensive state
regulation).
262. The court did reject the claim by Family Ministries that it stands in the relationship of
in loco parentis and thus expresses a religious preference on behalf of the natural parents.
Under state law an adoptive agency to which the child has been released does not thereby
acquire all the rights of a natural parent. 135 Cal. Rptr. at 438-39.
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funding program in Wilder v. Sugarman 263 (Wilder I)'and Wilder v.
Bernstein2 (Wilder II & Wilder II1). The State of New York has for
many years provided public assistance for the placement of children in
private foster-care homes. Moreover, the New York Constitution pro-
vides for religious matching in the placement of the children in foster
homes.265 In Wilder I, several plaintiffs challenged the religious match-
ing provisions as effectively discriminating on the bases of religion and
race. The theory was that in New York City the number of Protestant
black children needing placement far exceeded the number of openings in
Protestant foster agencies. That was not the case with Roman Catholic
and Jewish children desiring placement in homes consonant with their
religion. The result was that a disproportionate number of Protestant
black children had to go to state-operated shelters and training schools
that were significantly less desirable. The court in Wilder I, considered
only the issue of whether the religious matching provision of the state
constitution facially violated the Establishment Clause, and held that it
did not.
266
In Wilder II, the taxpayer-plaintiffs were found to have standing to
sue, plaintiffs were permitted to amend their complaint, and the suit was
certified as a class action.2 67 Several years of discovery and other trial
preparation ensued. Shortly before trial, the plaintiffs and the defendant-
city entered into negotiations for settlement. In mid-1984, these parties
arrived at a proposed stipulated settlement, concerning which the court
permitted several private-sector child-care agencies to intervene and op-
pose. Following further proceedings and modification of the proposed
settlement, a final stipulation was reached and approved in Wilder 111.16
s
Not all the religious homes agreed to the settlement. The district
court took up several objections by the religious agencies to the stipu-
lated settlement but rejected them all. The most serious objection was by
the Roman Catholic and Jewish agencies. The stipulated settlement was
263. 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
264. 499 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), and 645 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 848
F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1988). See also Wilder v. Bernstein, 725 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(private child-care agencies that intervened in action were prevailing parties entitled to recover
attorney's fees).
265. Article VII, § 32 of the New York Constitution provides that a child "shall be com-
mitted or remanded or placed, when practicable, in an institution or agency operated by per-
sons, or in the custody of a person, of the same religious persuasion as the child." For cases
concerning the interpretation of such state provisions, see In re Santos, 105 N.Y.S.2d 716
(1951), reargument and appeal denied, 107 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1951), appeal dismissed, 109 N.E.2d
71 (N.Y. 1952); In re Gally, 107 N.E.2d 21 (Mass. 1952).
266. 385 F. Supp. at 1021-27.
267. 499 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
268. 645 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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to the effect that children (with some exceptions) in need of placement
would be settled on a "first come, first served" basis without regard to
the religious preference of the parents. Further, the agencies that re-
ceived the child would then be responsible for providing the opportunity
for religious observance and training in accordance with each child's own
religion. If the child was of a religion other than that of the foster home,
meeting the needs of the child would often mean transporting the child
for religious services, holidays and other occasions to a house of worship
of the child's own faith or bringing in a minister of that faith to the foster
home.269 Thus the state continued to rely principally on private-sector
agencies of religious affiliation to care for foster children, but the discre-
tion of the religious agencies in selecting the children assigned to them
was severely restricted.
A second objection by the religious agencies to the stipulated settle-
ment concerned access of the children to contraception and abortion
services. Under the settlement, the city would supply the birth control
and abortion services. However, Roman Catholic agencies and others
have serious doctrinal objections to the provision of such services.
Nonetheless, the court rebuffed these objections.2 70
A third objection by the religious foster agencies divided the panel
assigned to hear the appeal before the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.2 71 The stipulated settlement placed some restrictions on the dis-
play of religious symbols in the foster homes. This was to reduce any
coercion or proselytizing of a child placed in a home of a different reli-
gious persuasion. For the majority, Judge Ward construed the stipula-
tion narrowly to reach only "where plaintiffs can demonstrate that a
religious symbol or aggregation of symbols displayed in the common ar-
eas of a child care agency has the effect of impermissibly chilling the Free
Exercise-Clause rights of children in the agency's care. '27 2 This narrow-
ing construction, however, did not satisfy the dissent. Judge Cardamone
thought the restriction on religious symbolism violated the Establish-
ment Clause prohibition on excessive entanglement between state officials
and religious agencies.273 As evidenced in the Wilder litigation, the ac-
ceptance of public funds significantly compromises the institutional in-
tegrity of a religious social ministry.
269. Id. at 1326-27.
270. Id. at 1328.
271. Wilder v. Bernstein, 848 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1988).
272. Id. at 1349 (quoting 645 F. Supp. at 1329).
273. Id. at 1350-52 (dissenting opinion). For an excellent discussion of the Wilder litiga-




The New York approach of deeply involving the state in placing
children needing care with sectarian agencies again caused a loss of reli-
gious liberty in Arneth v. Gross.2 74 In Arneth, New York City had placed
two teen-aged girls as foster children in the Mission of the Immaculate
Virgin, an agency of the Roman Catholic Church. The girls sued the
Mission because of the recent enforcement of an internal rule denying
foster children contraceptive devices and prescriptions and thus denying
them the option of practicing birth control. The Mission sought to en-
force the rule for doctrinal reasons.
The plaintiffs would probably have prevailed for Free Exercise
Clause reasons, because foster children should not be coerced into a reli-
gious practice that they did not share simply because they are placed by
the city in a religious foster home. However, the Free Exercise Clause
rights of the plaintiffs got no mention. Rather, the court found that the
Establishment Clause was implicated because the city's placement of
children in a religious home must operate in such a manner that it does
not "impermissibly foster" religion.275 Of course, the Mission, not the
government, was enforcing the rule on contraception. Nonetheless, be-
cause the Mission was substantially financed with public funds, the court
thereby reasoned that "the Mission is engaged in state action under the
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment and thus controlled by the said
[E]stablishment [C]lause."276
The implication that everything the Mission does in its foster home
is state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes is startling. The
very reason for the Mission's existence is fundamentally religious. If
everything the Mission does is state action because of public funding,
then the home cannot operate in any way other than to be devoid of
religious teaching and practice. Accordingly, under the court's view, the
foster home would have to be secular in all its operations or the Estab-
lishment Clause is violated. Indeed, the court so concluded when it said
that the operation of the foster home was a "secular branch of its
work." '2 7 7 One might well inquire, What other branches of the Mission's
work are there other than the caring for children? The plaintiffs received
the remedy requested when the Mission agreed to stop enforcement of
the rule against contraceptives.
274. 699 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (interlocutory order, certified for appeal by district
court).
275. Id. at 452.
276. Id. This "state action" holding is contrary to U.S. Supreme Court precedent. See
cases cited in supra note 261.
277. 699 F. Supp. at 453.
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C. State Common-Law and Case Law Regulation
This subpart focuses on the familiar common-law causes of action
that if allowed against social service ministries, can implicate government
involvement with religion. Many such claims do not, however, invoke
First Amendment concerns. For example, tort claims against a ministry
for premises liability, the now-commonplace negligence action arising
out of the use of a motor vehicle, and accidents that occur during alleged
improper supervision of children are all matters for which social minis-
tries are rightly accountable to the same degree as others.2 78 Moreover,
this equality of treatment in the law is reflected by the abandonment of
charitable immunity, although that defense has not been repealed in all
jurisdictions.27 9
The principal religious liberty clashes with the common law occur in
four subject areas: torts; contracts; charitable trust law; and undue influ-
ence in the consummation of gifts, bequests in wills, and charitable
trusts. With all four of these traditional common-law claims, any chari-
table organization, secular or religious, is understandably concerned with
the doctrine of respondeat superior and other forms of vicarious liability.
The doctrine of respondeat superior can cause liability to "ascend" from
subordinates to jeopardize the assets of the larger organization.280 Un-
278. See, e.g., Edwards v. Mt. Washington Baptist Day Care Ctr., 541 N.E.2d 465 (1988)
(no basis for a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress against church day-care center
brought by parents of child who learned hours after the fact that their child was temporarily
missing from the center).
279. Rupp v. Brookdale Baptist Church, 577 A.2d 188 (N.J. App. Div. 1990), held that a
claim on behalf of a child suffering personal injury while playing a game at a church-sponsored
day camp was barred by the New Jersey Charitable Immunity statute. It made no difference
that the child's parents were not members of the church or that they claimed that they were
unaware of the day camp's religious purposes. Compare Parker v. St. Stephen's Urban Dev.
Corp., 579 A.2d 360 (N.J. App. Div. 1990), in which the same state statute was found not
applicable to a personal injury claim brought against a non-profit corporation created by St.
Stephen's A.M.E. Zion Church of Asbury Park to develop low-income housing. The court of
appeals found that the non-profit corporation was created to serve solely as a conduit for
federal funds in conformity with federal regulations and thus was not a "charity" entitled to
statutory immunity.
280. Cf Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990) (A pastor em-
ployed as a counselor at a religious counseling center was sued by a former counselee for
sexual misconduct in the course of counseling sessions. The counseling center was also sued as
being vicariously liable for the intentional misconduct of its employee perpetrated in the course
of employment. The claim against the center was permitted. This decision does not follow the
majority of rulings elsewhere that disallow liability under respondeat superior in such situa-
tions. However, these other jurisdictions have allowed claims against the organization for
negligent hiring, training, and supervision). See generally David Frohlich, Note, Will Courts
Make Change for a Large Denomination?: Problems of Interpretation in an Agency Analysis in




like for-profit businesses, eleemosynary organizations cannot simply raise
their prices to account for vicarious liability as an additional cost of do-
ing business, and insurance costs further strain already tight budgets.
Social service ministries, however, are distinct from nonreligious benevo-
lent organizations in one regard: religious organizations have the addi-
tional concern for structuring their own polity and insisting that the
courts honor their ecclesiology, be it hierarchical, connectional or con-
gregational.281 Personnel relationships within non-hierarchical churches
often defy the traditional assumptions inherent in respondeat superior.
Taking into account the degree to which religious social ministries
approach the core of a given religion and its beliefs and practices,2" 2 the
law of torts should treat these ministries much the same as houses of
worship (churches, synagogues, mosques, or temples) for First Amend-
ment purposes. Tort claims have virtually exploded against clerics and
churches under theories of clergy malpractice, 83 breach of confidential
communication, z2 4 sexual seduction and child molestation,2 85 alienation
of affections,286 negligent (or intentional) infliction of emotional dis-
tress, 287 defamation, 288 invasion of privacy, and negligent hiring, training
281. In Barr v. United Methodist Church, 153 Cal. Rptr. 322, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973
(1979), reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980), the defendants adamantly maintained that there
was no such ecclesiastical organization as the national "United Methodist Church." Notwith-
standing, the court allowed present and former residents of a church-affiliated retirement home
to bring an action against the "United Methodist Church" along with the retirement home
corporation alleging fraud, breach of contract, and statutory violations. The loose association
of churches, said the state court of appeals, was a proper defendant, along with the retirement
home corporation that it promoted with its name, under the legal theory of alter ego or agency.
Following this decision to permit the suit to go forward, the claim was settled for $21 million
by the association of churches. NAT'L L.J., Dec. 29, 1980, at 10. Concerning the application
of respondeat superior being at odds with church polity, see EDWARD M. GAFFNEY & PHILIP
C. SORNENSEN, ASCENDING LIABILITY IN RELIGIOUS AND OTHER NON-PROFIT ORGANIZA-
TIONS (1984) (discussing Barr and other cases).
282. See the heuristic categories at text supra notes 10-11.
283. See Carl H. Esbeck, Tort Claims Against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officerv" The
First Amendment Considerations, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 78-84 (1986) (summarizing cases).
284. Id at 84-87 (summarizing cases).
285. Id at 87-88 (summarizing cases).
286. Id at 88-90 (summarizing cases).
287. See, eg., Murphy v. I.S.K. Con. of New England, 571 N.E.2d 340 (Mass.), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 191 (1991). In Murphy, a mother and daughter sued Krishna for torts com-
mitted while the daughter was involved with the sect as a minor. The claims alleged were
intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with parental rights, and
assault and battery. For religious liberty reasons, the highest court in Massachusetts set aside
a verdict for plaintiffs and dismissed the emotional distress counts. The matter was remanded
for a new trial on the remaining counts.
288. Esbeck, supra note 283, at 104-07 (summarizing cases).
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or supervision of employees. 289 In most of these tort cases, the state
courts are recognizing First Amendment defenses. Religious social agen-
cies and their officers, however, are unquestionably liable in intentional
tort for assault and battery,2 90 false imprisonment, 29 1 and the like, all
claims that involve coercive and often violent activity.292
289. See Lee Boothby, Church Liability Arising Out of Employment Relationship, in TORT
AND RELIGION 1, 20-27 (ABA National Institution on Tort and Religion, Division for Profes-
sional Education, June 14-15, 1990).
290. See Conway v. Carpenter, 87 N.Y. 428 (1894), in which a pastor had been dismissed
by his congregation. When he nonetheless entered the church, occupied the pulpit and refused
to leave when requested, he was forcibly ejected. Claim for assault and battery were brought
for injuries suffered by the violent ejection. See also Michigan v. Lewis, No. 83-S-0450 (Mich.
Dist. Ct., Allegan Cty. Oct. 18, 1983); Michigan v. McGee, No 83-S-0452 (Mich. Dist. CL,
Allegan Cty. Oct. 18, 1983). These two cases are prosecutions for criminal assault.
Gwendolyn Harris, a member of the House of Judah sect, was struck by the three defendants
on at least two occasions from which she sustained serious injury. A written consent signed by
her purporting to authorize punishment for wrongdoing, including beating, burning, stoning,
and hanging--sanctions said to be based on Old Testament scriptures-were held not to be
valid as against public policy. The court also denied the defense that striking Harris was an
exercise of religious discipline protected by the Free Exercise Clause.
291. A claim of false imprisonment was dismissed in Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the
Unification of World Christianity, 224 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 252
Cal. Rptr. 122 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989), for the reason that civil courts are
barred by the First Amendment from inquiring into the allegedly "mind-control" recruiting
techniques of sects, as long as force or the threat of force was not used. There was no evidence
that the former members now suing their church had been forced to stay against their will
other than the sect's spiritual "hold" on its members. Compare George v. International Soe'y
of Krishna Consciousness, No. 27-25-65 (Cal. Super. Ct., Orange Co.) (reported in 5 NAT'L
L.J. 6 (June 6, 1983)) (suit by ex-Krishna member alleging false imprisonment, civil conspiracy
to hide her from parents, libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress; appeal from judgment of $9.7 million), and Gallon v. House of Good Shepard, 122
N.W. 631 (Mich. 1909) (false imprisonment claim lies against parachurch society for reform of
wayward girls), with O'Moore v. Driscoll, 28 P.2d 438 (Cal. 1933) (false imprisonment claim
dismissed as against religious order).
292. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), broadly outlines the limits of First
Amendment liberties when dealing with activities that are violent or threaten an immediate
breach of the peace. In Cantwell, the Court overturned a criminal conviction for breach of the
peace of an itinerant preacher. Although the minister had approached members of the public
with verbal and written information offensive to many, no violence took place or was likely. In
dicta, explaining speech-related conduct that a state could legitimately regulate, the Court
said:
The offense known as breach of the peace embraces a great variety of conduct
destroying or menacing public order and tranquility. It includes not only violent acts
but acts and words likely to produce violence in others. No one would have the
hardihood to suggest that the principle of freedom of speech sanctions incitement to
riot or that religious liberty connotes the privilege to exhort others to physical attack
upon those belonging to another sect. When clear and present danger of riot, disor-
der, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to
public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the state to prevent or punish is
obvious....
Like churches, social service ministries can be sued for breach of
contract, including claims for wrongful discharges of employees. Ac-
cordingly, in O'Connor Hospital v. Superior Court,293 a Roman Catholic
priest and former chaplain at a hospital sponsored and operated by a
religious order brought an action for wrongful termination. The state
court of appeals held that permitting such a claim would infringe on the
hospital's right of free exercise of religion, and that granting immunity
from such a claim did not violate the Establishment Clause.29 4
At common law the attorney general of a state had standing to bring
an action against a charitable trust so as to protect the public interest.295
Authorization for such claims has presently been codified in most
states.296 In Abrams v. Temple of the Lost Sheep,297 the New York Attor-
ney General sued to compel compliance with his subpoena issued in the
course of an investigation against a religious organization that was solic-
One may... be guilty of the offense [of breach of the peace] if he commit[s] acts
or make[s] statements likely to provoke violence and disturbance of good order, even
though no such eventuality be intended....
We find in the instant case no assault or threatening of bodily harm, no trucu-
lent bearing, no intentional discourtesy, no personal abuse....
The danger in these times from the coercive activities of those who in the delu-
sion of racial or religious conceit would incite violence and breaches of the peace in
order to deprive others of their equal right to the exercise of their liberties, is empha-
sized by events familiar to all. These and other transgressions of those limits the
states appropriately may punish.
IM. at 308-10. Although Cantwell involved criminal prosecution, the same constitutional limits
on the scope of religious liberty would apply to state-created or state-sanctioned tort actions.
293. 240 Cal. Rptr. 766 (6th Dist. 1987) (official report of opinion deleted by order of the
state supreme court), cert denied, Clev v. O'Connor Hospitals, Inc., 486 U.S. 1007 (1988).
294. 240 Cal. Rptr. at 770-74, 775. But see Reardon v. Lemoyne, 454 A.2d 428 (1982), and
New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary v. Babcock, 554 So. 2d 90 (La. Ct. App.), cert
denied, 558 So. 2d 607 (La. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 214 (1990). In Reardon the state
supreme court held that four nuns who were discharged from their teaching responsibilities at
a Catholic school could sue for breach of contract alleging that the terms of their employment
agreement as set out in a policy handbook required that they be given a due process hearing
before they could be discharged. In Babcock, a seminary upon finding a student morally and
spiritually unfit, refused to award him a degree. A state court of appeals overturned that
decision. By outlining its policy on divorce and describing its due process procedures in a
student handbook, the court held that the seminary was contractually bound and that the First
Amendment was not a defense. See also Gillespie v. Elkins So. Baptist Church, 350 S.E.2d 715
(W. Va. 1986) (dismissing wrongful discharge suit by pastor utilizing neutral principles of law
approach); Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (First Amendment pre-
vents wrongful discharge claim of female cleric against former church and her superior; but
claim for predischarge sexual harassment actionable); Curran v. Catholic Univ. of Am., No.
1552-87, slip op. (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 1989) (denying claim of wrongful discharge as
without merit).
295. IVA WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, ScoTr ON TRusTs 357-60 (4th ed. 1989).
296. Mra t 360 n.7, 363 n.21. See generally Dallin H. Oaks, Trust Doctrines in Church
Controversies, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rnv. 805.
297. 562 N.Y.S.2d 322 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
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iting money from the public. The court permitted the investigation to
continue, stating that no credible First Amendment defenses could un-
dermine the Attorney General's authority "to conduct investigations to
determine if charitable solicitations are free from fraud and whether
charitable assets are being properly used for the benefit of intended bene-
ficiaries."29 In a related action, Abrams v. New York Foundation for the
Homeless,299 the court found that a foundation and shelter for the home-
less affiliated with the Temple of the Lost Sheep, Inc., had no valid reli-
gious liberty defense to the investigation into alleged fraud and
misrepresentation in solicitation of funds. Likewise, Queen of Angels
Hospital v. Younger 3" upheld a state attorney general's authority to su-
pervise the activities of a nonprofit, religious hospital. Nevertheless, the
hospital, operated by a Roman Catholic order, was protected from inter-
ference by the attorney general into matters concerning the hospital's
operation that implicate religious doctrine or practice.
Perhaps the most widely publicized controversy over regulation of
the finances of a religious organization concerned the California State
Attorney General's taking over the entire financial operations of the
Worldwide Church of God.30 1 The attorney general's actions were based
on allegations of fiscal irregularities by church officials. The attorney
general asserted authority based on the state's interests in charitable
trusts, which the attorney general maintained was so broadly defined as
to include a church. Accordingly, he argued that status as a church per-
mitted the use of the provisional remedy of receivership to investigate the
allegations of fraud. Eventually, the legislature passed a law explicitly
denying authority to the attorney general to institute such actions against
religious bodies.302
298. Id. at 324.
299. 562 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (preliminary injunction against solicitation
granted).
See also Marcus v. Jewish Nat'l Fund, 557 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1990) (Donors were granted
injunctive relief against a fund collecting money for land development projects in Israel. Do-
nors claim was for false advertising and fraud in that fund misled donors into thinking money
was used in Israeli occupied territories).
300. 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 (2d Dist. 1977).
301. People v. Worldwide Church of God, No. C. 267 607 (Cal. Sup. Ct., filed Jan. 2,
1979), cerL denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 987 (1980).
302. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9230 (West 1983). For discussion of the Worldwide Church of
God case, see Whelan, Who Owns the Churches?, in GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELI-
GIous AFFAIRS 57 (Kelley ed., 1983); Jackson, Socialized Religion: California's Public Trust
Theory, 16 VAL. U. L. REv. 185 (1981); Sharon L. Worthing, The State Takes Over a Church,
446 ANNALS 136 (1979); Giovan H. Venable, Note, Courts Examine Congregationalism, 41
STAN. L. REv. 719, 736-37 (1989); Stephen P. Radar, Note, Government Protection of Church
Assets from Fiscal Abuse: The Constitutionality of Attorney General Enforcement Under the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1277 (1980); Darrell R. Shep-
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The law of gifts, bequests in wills, and trusts has long policed the
relationship between religious authorities and donors, permitting the rev-
ocation of property transfers brought about by undue influence or mis-
representation." 3 The long history of such causes of action demonstrates
that they can exist alongside religious liberty concerns without serious
First Amendment infractions.3" Such cases have often attracted consid-
erable notoriety. For example, in In re The Bible Speaks,3"5 the court
held that evidence supported a finding that $5.5 million in donations to a
church by the young heiress to the Dayton-Hudson fortune should be
rescinded because the gifts were obtained through undue influence. Pre-
sumably these same common law rules that apply to churches and eccle-
siastics are applicable to social service ministries and their employees.
Conclusion
Religiously based social service ministries have rightly been praised
for their volunteerism, flexibility, efficiency of operation, and heartfelt
concern for the persons who receive their charity. Moreover, the trend
in favor of church-government partnerships in the delivery of community
welfare needs, virtually assures their continued survival. But there are
problems, not the least of which is whether the institutional integrity and
purity of religious charities can survive too close an embrace by
government.
The courts have for the most part sustained the licensure of social
service ministries pursuant to state police power. This seems to be a
proper view of the First Amendment, so long as the government's inter-
est is in health and safety concerns and thereby eschews crossing over
into matters concerning religiously based curriculum, program, method-
ard, Note, Receivers, Churches and Nonprofit Corporations: A First Amendment Analysis, 56
IND. L.J. 175 (1980).
303. See, ag., Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ Scientist, 490 N.E.2d 1319, cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 915 (1986) (claim of undue influence dismissed for First Amendment rea-
sons); Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co. v. Brooks, 200 So. 2d 251 (Fla. App. 1967) (constructive
trust imposed where rector induced conveyance to church). See generally Annotation, Undue
Influence in Nontestamentary Gift to Clergyman, Spiritual Advisor, or Church, 14 A.L.R.2d
649 (1950); RESTATEMENT OF REsTTiON §§ 167, 184 (1937).
304. See, eg., Ambassador College v. Goetzke, 260 S.E.2d 27 (1979), cert denied, 444 U.S.
1079 (1980); Ambassador College v. Goetzke, 675 F.2d 662 (5th Cir.) (related case), cert
denied, 459 U.S. 862 (1982); McElroy v. Ambassador College, 308 N.W.2d 417 (Wis. Ct. App.
1981); Nelson v. Dodge, 68 A.2d 51 (R.I. 1949); Latham v. Father Divine, 85 N.E.2d 168
(N.Y. 1949); Brown v. Father Divine, 298 N.Y.S. 642 (N.Y. 1937), aff'd, 4 N.Y.S.2d 989
(1938).
305. 73 Bankr. 848 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987), aff'd, The Bible Speaks v. Dovydenas, 81
Bankr. 750 (D. Mass. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, In re The Bible Speaks, 869 F.2d
628 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, The Bible Speaks v. Dorydenas, 493 U.S. 816 (1989).
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ology, or selection of professional personnel. In the few cases where reli-
gious organizations have successfully challenged state regulation, it has
been because regulations are found void for vagueness and thus violative
of procedural due process rights.
The most serious problem of government intervention in religious
affairs, and thus the most acute First Amendment concern, arises where
public funds bring with them the inevitable regulations that force these
ministries to either conform to bureaucratic standards or jettison their
faith-centered practices. The new conservative majority on the U.S.
Supreme Court has signaled that it will give great deference to the
choices by Congress and the states (as reflected in legislation) to both
regulate and to fund religiously based social services. Accordingly, so far
as the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment are concerned, religious
organizations should expect little relief in the federal courts from in-
creased governmental intervention in their ministries.
On the other hand, if Congress or a state legislature grants exemp-
tions for religious organizations, such exemptions would not violate the
Establishment Clause. But statutory exemptions are difficult to obtain
politically, especially where the regulation is attendant to government
funding. Moreover, statutory exemptions are won only by the politically
active and by those with sufficient resources to have a presence at the
statehouses and the nation's capitol. This is possible on a sustained basis
only for the larger churches. And there is danger, as well, any time reli-
gion is forced to behave as if it is just another interest group lobbying for
special accommodation.
Constitutional relief may be available in certain states because of a
resurgence in the application of state bills of rights,30 6 but such protec-
tion will not be available in every state, will be uneven in the states where
it is obtained, and will be secured only after expensive litigation. In sum-
mary, there is considerable juridical and political work to be done if the
social service ministries of religious organizations are to evade increasing
domination by all levels of government.
306. See G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 WASH. L. REv. 73 (1989); Rob-
ert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: Comment on
Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. REv. 635 (1987); Ronald K.L. Collins, et al., State High
Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial Survey, 16
PuaLIus, Summer 1986, at 141; J. Skelly Wright, In Praise of State Courts: Confessions of a
Federal Judge, 11 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 165 (1984); Hans A. Linde, First Things First:
Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379 (1980).
